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This article  concerns what I will  call the  ambivalent resistance  of
U.S.  constitutional law to explicit learning and borrowing from other
nations' constitutional decisions and traditions.  It begins in Part I by
identifying  this resistance  and explaining  in what respects  it  is  am-
bivalent, and goes on in Part II to suggest reasons for the resistance
and for why it may diminish in the future.  To explore the attractions
and  dilemmas  of comparative  constitutional  law,  Part  III  examines
how a particular doctrine found  in Canadian  constitutional  law,  the
so-called "proportionality" test of R.  v.  Oakes,' might bear on  recent
constitutional issues of federalism and individual rights in the United
States.  This section argues for the value of studying foreign constitu-
tional law, while at the same time urging caution about the possibility
of direct "transplants."  Finally, the  article  explores  the  relationship
between  the U.S.  Supreme Court's resistance to  considering foreign
constitutional law and its resistance to input from other domestic in-
stitutions, notably Congress, on the meaning of the U.S.  Constitution.
It argues for a broader understanding of what is relevant to U.S.  con-
stitutional  interpretation,  embracing  both  congressional judgments
and judgments reached by the  constitutional  courts of other nations
considering similar problems.
. John  Carroll Research  Professor of Law  (1998-99).  Georgetown  University  Law Center.
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I See [1986]  1 S.C.1L 103,  108 (holding that a statutory presumption that possession of nar-
cotics implied trafficking violated the presumption  of innocence guaranteed by the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and was unconstitutional  because it uas not "demonstrablyjus-
tified in a free and democratic society").JOURNAL OF  CONS TITUIONAL LAW
I.  AMBIVALENT  RESISTANCE
Members of the current U.S.  Supreme Court have  on more  than
one occasion  rejected  the  utility of considering  constitutional  prac-
tice  in other countries.  In 1997, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court
in  Printz v.  United States, 2  explained  why,  in  his view,  "comparative
analysis  [is]  inappropriate  to the  task of interpreting a  constitution,
though it was  of course  quite  relevant  to the  task  of writing one."3
Justice  Scalia also made a narrower argument, that "our federalism is
not Europe's,"4 suggesting  that European practice  in federal  systems
was not relevant to the question before the Court - whether Congress
had the power to compel local government officials  to perform back-
ground checks under a federal gun law.
Justice Scalia was writing in response to an argument made in dis-
sent by Justice  Breyer.  Writing  for himself and  for Justice  Stevens,
Justice  Breyer argued  that the  experiences  of the federal  systems  of
Switzerland,  Germany and the European Union indicate that a system
in  which  local  governments  carry out  directives  of the  central  gov-
ernment  may  "interfere[]  less,  not  more,  with  the  independent
authority  of the...  subsidiary  government...."  Breyer  suggested
that this comparative  experience  shows that "there is no need to  in-
terpret  the  Constitution  as  containing  an absolute  principle forbid-
ding the assignment  of virtually any federal duty to a state official" in
order  to  reconcile  "central  authority  with  the  need to  preserve  the
liberty-enhancing  autonomy of smaller constituent governmental  en-
tit[ies].  (Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter and Ginsberg would have
upheld  the  relatively  small  burden  imposed  on local  sheriffs  to  im-
plement the background checks.)
7
2  521  U.S.  898  (1997)  (holding unconstitutional  "Brady Act"  interim  provisions  requiring
local law  enforcement officers  to conduct background  checks on prospective  gun purchasers,
based on ground that it is inconsistent with the implicit rule of U.S.  federalism that the federal
government cannot "commandeer" state officers into executing federal law). 3 Id. at 921 n. 11.
4  Id.  In  contrast, consider Justice Frankfurter's  attempts  earlier in  this century  to invoke
similarities between the constitutional federalism of the United States, of Canada and of Austra-
lia on issues of intergovernmental  tax immunity. See e.g., United States v. Allegheny County, 322
U.S.  174,  198  (1944)  (Frankfurter,J.  dissenting)  ("In respect to the problem we  are consider-
ing, the constitutional  relation of the Dominion  of Canada  to  its constituent  Provinces  is the
same as that of the United States to the States.  A recent decision of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada is therefore  pertinent.  In  City of Vancouver v. Attorney-General of Canada [1944]  S.C.R. 23,
that Court denied  the Dominion's claim  to immunity in a situation precisely like  this, as I  be-
lieve we should deny the  claim of the Government.");  Graves  v. New York  ex reL O'Keefe,  306
U.S. 466,  491  (1939)  (Frankfurter, J., concurring)  (intergovernmental  tax immunity  case raises
the "same legal issues" as in Australia and Canada under cited provisions of their constitutional
acts).  For a critique  of Frankfurter's assumption  that the constitutional  relationships were  the
same, see infra note 46.
Printz,  521 U.S.  at 976.
6  Id. at 977.
7 The burden was not only relatively small  (particularly in light of the U.S.  government in-
terpretation  of the "reasonable  efforts"  language  of the  statute,  see Respondent's  Brief at  6,
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Resistance  and ambivalence:  Justice  Breyer  argued  for the  rele-
vance  of comparative  experience  in  resolving  an  open  question  of
constitutional  interpretation,  one  to be informed  by understanding
the  empirical  consequences  of  different  interpretations."  Justice
Scalia,  in contrast,  acknowledged  the  contributions  of comparative
study to the formation of the  Constitution  but resisted its appropri-
ateness to the  task of interpretation.9  But did he resist comparative
study in Printz  because it can never be appropriate?  Or, did he resist
such  study  because  the  issues  of federal  structure  somehow  were
unique to the United States?  And does Justice  Scalia really speak for
even the fivejustice majority of the Printz  Court? 3 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who joined Scalia's opinion in Printz, has
taken a more receptive  view of the benefits of comparative  constitu-
tional law to courts in the United States, both in his opinions" and in
his other writings.  In a speech given in 1989 at a symposium in con-
nection with  the  40th  anniversary  of the  German  Basic  Law,  Chief
Justice Rehnquist stated:
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States
exercising the power ofjudicial review had no precedents  to
look to save  their own,  because  our courts alone  exercised
this sort of authority.  When many new constitutional courts
were  created  after  the  Second  World  War,  these  courts
naturally looked  to decisions  of the Supreme  Court of the
United  States,  among other sources,  for  developing  their
own  law.  But  now  that  constitutional  law  is  solidly
grounded  in so  many countries,  it is  time that the  United
States courts begin looking to the  decisions of other consti-
tutional courts to aid in their own deliberative process.  The
United States courts,  and legal scholarship  in our country
generally,  have been  somewhat laggard in  relying on com-
parative law and decisions of other countries.  But I predict
Pintz (No. 95-1478)  citing  ATF Guidances)  but was  also  time-limited.  The requirement  that
local law enforcement  officers perform background  checks lasted for five )ars,  at which  time.
in November 1998, the obligation  became that of the federal  government, using a computer-
ized national data base developed during the interim period.
See Printz,  521 U.S.  at977.
9 Seei Lat921 n.11.
0 Note that in Washington  v. Glucksberg,  521 U.S.  702 (1997),  ChiefJustice Rehnquist. writing
for a Court that includedJustice Scalia, cited and described decisions  from other nations' con-
stiutional courts in identifying the relevant "background" to evaluate  the claim that the State of
Washington's prohibition on assisted suicide violates  the Due Process Clause.  See id. at 718 n.16
(citing, inter aLia, a 1993 Canadian  Supreme Court decision, Rdrigu:  to. British C lurd  ia (Attor-
ne)-Ceneral),  107 D.LR. (4th) 342 (1993),  which construed the 1982 Canadian  Charter of Rights
and Freedoms not to include a right to assisted suicide).
"  See Glucksberg, 521  U.S. at 718 n.16; Planned Parenthood of S.E.  Pa. v. Case.  505 U.S.  833.
945 n.1  (1992)  (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in thejudgment in part and dissenting in part) (cit-
ing abortion  decisions by the West German Constitutional  Court and the Canadian  Supreme
Court).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
that with so many thriving constitutional  courts in the world
today ...  that  approach  will  be  changed  in  the  near  fu-
ture.
But the same year as Rehnquist's  1989 speech, Justice  Scalia,  writ-
ing for the Court, rejected the relevance of the practice  in  other na-
tions,  while  the  dissent  argued  to  the  contrary,  in  Stanford v.  Ken-
tucky,3  a case addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty for
juveniles convicted of murder.  No question of government structure
was presented,  to which the claim of a uniquely American federalism
might apply; rather, the question was one of pure individual right.  In
Stanford, the  Court  rejected  a  claim  that  the  imposition  of capital
punishment for crimes committed when the defendant was age  16 or
17 was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
In the first footnote in the opinion, the Court wrote:
We  emphasize  that  it is  American conceptions  of decency
that are dispositive,  rejecting the contentions of petitioners
and  their various  amid...  that the sentencing  practices  of
other  countries  are  relevant.  While  "[t]he  practices  of
other nations,  particularly other democracies,  can  be  rele-
vant to determining whether a practice uniform among our
people  is  not merely  an  historical  accident, but rather  'so
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'  that it occupies a
place  not merely in  our mores, but, text permitting, in  our
Constitution  as  well,"  Thompson  v.  Oklahoma, 487  U.S.  815,
868-869  n.4  (1988)  (Scalia, J.,  dissenting)  ...  they  cannot
serve  to establish  the  first Eighth Amendment  prerequisite
that the practice is accepted among our people.'
4
Other voices on the Court, however, argued that foreign constitu-
tional  practices  were  relevant.  In his  Stanford dissent, Justice  Bren-
nan, joined by Justices  Marshall,  Blackmun  and  Stevens,  wrote  that
"choices of governments  elsewhere  in the world also merit our atten-
tion as  indicators whether  a punishment  is  acceptable  in a  civilized
society.'' 5  He went on to note specifically  that over fifty countries, in-
cluding  nearly  all  of Western  Europe,  had  formally  abolished  the
death  penalty,  twenty-seven  other countries  did  not in practice  im-
pose the death penalty, and of those countries that retained it, a ma-
jority  did  not permit the  execution  of juveniles.  justice  Brennan
1  William  Rehnquist,  Constitutional  Courts-Comparative  Remarks  (1989), reprinted in GERMANY
AND  ITS BASIC LAW:  PAST,  PRESENT AND  FuTURE-A  GERMAN-AMERICAN  SYMPosIUMi 411,412  (Paul
Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1993). is  492 U.S. 361 (1989).
14 Id. at 369 n.1  (emphasis in original).
15  Id. at 384 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
16  See id. at 389 (referring to amicus brief submitted by Amnesty International).
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and the  other  dissenters  believed  that  the  legal  practice  of other
countries was relevant,  though not dispositive, on the  constitutional
question of "cruel and unusual punishment.""
As cases cited by bothJustice Scalia andJustice  Brennan illustrate,
at least for purposes  of Eighth  Amendment  doctrine,  standards  of
punishment in other countries have on occasion  been viewed  as rele-
vant to the  constitutional  question  whether a particular punishment
is "cruel and unusual."8  Earlier, in Trop v. Dulles,'9 the plurality opin-
ion of the ChiefJustice relied on the practice  of other nations to con-
clude that loss of citizenship for desertion  was unconstitutional,  not-
ing  that  "banishment  [is]  a  fate  universally  decried  by  civilized
people."  20  The Court noted further that the "international  commu-
nity of democracies" deplores statelessness and that a United Nations
survey "reveal[ed]  only two countries...  [that] impose denationaliza-
tion as a penalty for desertion.
Opposing  stances  towards  the  relevance  of practice  and  experi-
ence  in  other  countries  in resolving  constitutional  questions  occur
even earlier in our constitutional history as well.  In Fong Tue Ting v.
United States,2  for example,  the  Court upheld  a  statute  authorizing
the  deportation of Chinese laborers  who did not possess  a required
residency  certificate  unless,  on the  testimony of at  least  one  "white
witness,"  they met the conditions to excuse them from  the certificate
requirement.  In so ruling, the majority began by noting the universal
practice  of sovereigns  to  retain  the  right to  expel  aliens,  a right  it
found unconstrained  by the  Constitution.2  While  the  majority  in-
voked  foreign  practices,  it was  the  dissenting justices  who  invoked
American exceptionalism.  According to Justice Brewer:
17 See id. ("Our cases recognize  that objective  indicators of contemporary standards of de-
cency in the form of legislation  in other countries  is also  of relevance  to Eighth  Amendment
SeeThompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815,830  (1988)  (StevensJ., for the plurality)  (look-
ing to "other nations that share  our Anglo-American  heritage,"  and "leading  members of the
Western European community" to confirm  that it would "offend civilized standards of decenct
to execute juvenile for crimes committed before age 16); Enmund v. Florida. 458  U.S.  782
, 796
n.22  (1982)  (noting developments in European and  Commonwealth  countries for support in
holding the death penalty unconstitutional for robber who did not kill or intend  to kill); Coke-
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584,596 n.10  (1977)  (White,J., plurality opinion)  ('It is...  not irrelemnt
here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in  1965, only 3 retained  the death pen-
alty for rape where death did not ensue.")  (WhiteJ., for the plurality).
"  356 U.S. 86 (1958).
0 1d.  at 102  (Warren,  CJ.,  announcing judgment  of Court  and opinion joined  by  Black.
Douglas, and WhitakerJJ.).
21 Id. at 102-03.
149 U.S. 698, 728 (1893)  (upholding federal statute providing for exclusion and remoal
of Chinese persons  and for punishment at hard labor prior to removal,  and further pro'iding
registration system for Chinese laborers requiring either special certificate of residence or proof
on testimony of "one credible white  wimess" of their entitlement to reside).
See i.  at 711  (referring to "an inherent and inalienable right of every soireign and inde-
pendent nation").JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The governments of other nations have elastic  powers - ours
is  fixed and bounded by a written  constitution.  The expul-
sion  of a  race may be within  the  inherent powers of a des-
potism.  History, before  the  adoption  of this Constitution,
was  not  destitute  of examples  of the  exercise  of such  a
power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely,
as it seems  to me,  they gave  to this government no general
power to banish.24
Justice Field  also  dissented.  After  disagreeing that English prac-
tice had been correctly described, he wrote:
[E]ven  if  that  power  [of  deportation  of resident  aliens]
were  exercised  by  every  government  of Europe,  it would
have  no  bearing  in  these  cases....  Spain  expelled  the
Moors;  England, in the reign  of Edward I, banished fifteen
thousand Jews;  and  Louis  XIV,  in  1685,  by  revoking  the
Edict of Nantes, which  gave  religious liberty  to Protestants
in France,  drove  out the Huguenots ....  Within  [the  last]
three  years  Russia  has  banished  many  thousands  of Jews,
and apparently intends the expulsion of the whole race - an
act  of barbarity  which  has  aroused  the indignation  of  all
Christendom....  [A]l1  the instances mentioned have  been
condemned for their barbarity and cruelty, and no power to
perpetrate  such barbarity  is to  be implied from  the nature
of our government,  and certainly is  not found in any dele-
gated  powers  under  the  Constitution.  The  government of
the United States is one of limited and delegated powers.  It
takes nothing  from the usages or the former action of European  gov-
ernments, nor does it take any power by any supposed inherent sov-
ereignty.2
Perhaps just as  noteworthy  as  the  cases  in which justices  of the
U.S.  Supreme  Court  discuss  the  relevance  of foreign  constitutional
practice  or reasoning  are the  cases  in which  they do not, but easily
could have.  For  example,  in  1992  the  Court  held,  in RA. V.  v.  St.
24 Id. at 737 (Brewer,J. dissenting).
Id. at  757  (Field, J.  dissenting)  (citations  omitted)  (emphasis  added).  Brewer's  and
Field's claims  here might be compared with the debate, in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996),  over  the relevance  of English  constitutional  history  to  the relative  scope of congres-
sional and presidential  power in determining the punishment for courts martials.  The  Loving
majority relied  on one (somewhat contested)  view of what was permitted  under English law at
the time  of the framing.  Justice  Scalia argued  that this view was "irrelevant" since  the framers
deliberately  adopted  a model  of governance quite distinct from  the Westminster  model.  See
Loving, 517 U.S. at 775-76  (ScaliaJ. concurring in part).  In either event, both the majority and
Justice Scalia treated the foreign practice as relevant, if at all, only as it bore on the original  un-
derstanding of the  clauses  in question,  a significant but not exclusive  mode of constitutional
decision-making in the United States.
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Pau4
2 6  that a  local ordinance  prescribing "fighting words" based  on
racial bias violated  the  First Amendment  because  it amounted  to  a
content-based regulation.  Neither the majority nor the dissent in this
closely-divided case alluded to how other constitutional governments
have  addressed  this  problem,  notwithstanding  Justice  Scalia's  ac-
knowledgment in the opinion for the Court that "[flrom  1791  to the
present...  our  society,  like  other  free  but  civilized  societies,  has
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited ar-
eas...."2  Readily available  were  the  opinions of the  Canadian  Su-
preme  Court in  R.  v.  Keegstra,2s in  which  that  Court  addressed  at
length its reasons for upholding the constitutionality of a statute pro-
hibiting the "wilful  promotion  of hatred, other  than in private  con-
versation,  towards any section of the public distinguished  by colour,
race, religion or ethnic origin."" While  the several  lengthy opinions
in  the  Keegstra  case  extensively  discussed  U.S.  First  Amendment
cases,s  the U.S. Supreme Court two years later was silent on  this po-
tentially valuable comparative resource.
As these examples illustrate, the U.S.  Supreme Court is resistant to
considering foreign constitutional  law, even in areas where there are
materials close at hand that address similar problems within the con-
text of a western,  liberal  democratic  republic  (and  that discuss  the
U.S.  Court's prior precedents).  But the resistance  is often seen in si-
lence.  And it is ambivalent - sometimes silently, sometimes expressly.
In what respects  is  U.S.  constitutional  law ambivalent  about  bor-
rowing from or considering foreign constitutional  decisions?  First, it
is evident that the different justices are receptive in differing degrees
to the possible bearing of comparative constitutional  law, with several
2  505 U.S.  377 (1992).
SI&  at 382-83.
[1990]  3 S.C.R. 697.  Although Canadian  Supreme Court decisions are available, in Eng-
lish,  in  major law  libraries  (and were  accessible  on-line  through  QUICKLAIW  beginning  in
1989),  Keegstra  was apparenly mentioned in only one of the many briefs filed in ILA.  ,: (based
on an examination of the Table of Authorities of those  briefs available on LEXIS).  See Brief
Amicus of the National Black Women's  Health Project in Support of Respondent, RA.V.  v. St.
Paul, 505  U.S.  377  (1992)  (No. 90-7675);  see also Brief Amicus  Curiae of the Asian-American
Legal Defense and Education Fund eL al., R.A.V. V.  St. Paul, 505 U.S.  377 (1992)  (No. 90-7675)
(listing a 1989 law reiew article comparing U.S.  and Canadian approaches  to hate speech).  If
lawyers are  not aware  of and do  not refer to constitutional  decisions of other courts, it is less
likelv that the Court will do so.
-o  Keegstra [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 713.
n1  See id. at 739-42  (Dickson, CJ.); id. at 812-22  (McLaclin.J., dissenting).
Similarly, with the exception ofJustice Frankfurter's reliance on Australian and Canadian
decisions on intergovernmental  tax issues, U.S.  Supreme Court decisions earlier in this century
on federalism issues tended not to refer to cases from Canadian or Australian  courts on analo-
gous issues.  Compare Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20  (1922)  (invalidating federal tax
designed,  through exemptions,  to require  limits on child  labor)  with  Re.'  v.  Barger,  (1908)  6
C.LPR. 41  (High Court of Australia)  (holding that 'implied  prohibitions" of the constitution -
to protect state authority and to regulate labor conditions - invaidated federal  tax on manufac-
tured goods designed,  through  exemptions,  to impose  minimal  working  condition  require-
ments).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
current members of the Court open at least to thinking about foreign
decisions.2  Justice  Scalia's rejection  of the relevance  of foreign con-
stitutional  practices  in Printz may be  an  outlier, notwithstanding  its
appearance  in his opinion for the Printz Court. 33  Further, his view  is
that comparative  experience  is relevant  to  making a  constitution but
not to  interpreting  one:" On this view, to the extent that the process of
interpretation  resembles  the  making  of a constitution,  comparative
experience  could still be relevant. 35  Finally, the view that comparative
experience  is irrelevant  (or less relevant)  on structural issues such as
federalism,  even  if accepted,  would not necessarily  rule out its rele-
32  Some justices, present  and past, resort to comparative  experience in constitutional  deci-
sion-making with  relative degrees  of comfort, sometimes to support claims of the distinctiveness
of the U.S. experience, while  at other times as if they were  relevant and  helpful  to the resolu-
tion of domestic  constitutional  questions.  Compare Printz v.  United States,  521  U.S.  898, 921
n.11  (1997)  (asserting irrelevance of other nations, experience  to U.S. constitutional  interpre-
tation), Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 775-76  (1996)  (Scalia,J., concurring in part)  (as-
serting that the framers of the U.S. Constitution  put it in writing to make  clear that it was  dif-
ferent from the English government it replaced)  and Fong Yue Ting v. United States,  149 U.S.
698, 737, 757 (1893)  (Brewer & Field,J.J., dissenting)  (rejecting the applicability  of the foreign
doctrine of inherent sovereignty and emphasizing  the irrelevance of foreign government  prac-
tices  to  U.S.  constitutional  law),  with United  States  v. Allegheny  County,  322  U.S.  174,  198
(1944)  (Frankfurter, J. dissenting)  (relying on a decision  of the Supreme  Court of Canada  on
the ground that the relation of Canada to its Provinces resembles that of the United States to its
States)  and Printz v. United States, 521  U.S. 898,  977 (1997)  (Breyer, J., dissenting)  (observing
that  despite  structural differences  between  legal systems, foreign  legal experience  "may none-
theless  cast an empirical  light on the  consequences  of different solutions  to  a common  legal
problem").
3  And even Justice Scalia has  on occasion  acknowledged a  (quite)  limited  role for foreign
practice.  See Thompson  v. Oklahoma,  487 U.S.  815, 868-69  n.4  (1988)  (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(stating that the practices of other democracies may be relevant to determining whether  a prac-
tice uniformly adopted by the American people is merely a historical  accident or is instead "im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty").
SeePrintz, 521  U.S. at921 n.ll.
25  In a strict jurisprudence  of original intent, foreign experience  may be irrelevant  (except
insofar as it relates to the understandings of the original  group whose intentions count).  Justice
Scalia, for instance, implies that judges can only interpret, and never  make, the constitution  and
has worked to develop ajurisprudence that appropriately constrains judicial choices by rooting
them,  wherever  possible,  in  original  decisions  reflected  in  authoritative  texts.  See Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The LesserEvil, 57 U.  CIN.  L. REv. 849 (1989).  Fewjustices, however, are  rig-
idly  committed  to originalism  as  the sole method  of interpretation, particularly on structural
issues  of federalism and separation  of powers, and it is a method whose  drawbacks are legion.
For illustrative discussions, see H. Jefferson  Powell,  The Original Understanding  of Original  Intent,
98 HARV.  L.  REV. 885  (1985); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A  Critique of  Inter-
pretivism and Neutral  Principles,  96  HARv.  L.  REv.  781,  786-804  (1983);  Ronald  Dworkin,  The Fo-
rum of Principle,  56 N.Y.U. L. REV.  469, 472-500  (1981).
That interpretation  of federalism-related  provisions in other constitutions  may be of less
relevance  than comparative  decisions in other areas has some plausibility because of the deeply
and necessarily pragmatic,  contextual  and dynamic nature  of successful constitutional federal-
ism.  See generally  Vicki  C. Jackson, Federalism  and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?,
111  HARV.  L. REV.  2180, 2228-29  (1998)  [hereinafterJackson,  Federalism]. By contrast,  the indi-
vidual rights claims of the Declaration of Independence, which served as the basis for provisions
in the U.S. Bill of Rights, were designed  to be appealing to an international  audience and drew
on traditions  of what today might be called international  human  rights; the international  ap-
peal  of human rights  to be free  from torture, discrimination,  religious  oppression  are embod-
ied in several  international  conventions  today.  See, e.g.,  International  Covenant on  Civil  and
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vance on issues of individual rights7
Moreover,  courts  can  use  comparative  experience  for different
reasons and in different ways.  A constitution might be read to require
consideration  of foreign  practice  or  decisions,  for example,  as  evi-
dence of a practice that bears  on a criterion  like "usualness" in  the
Eighth Amendment  arena."  Alternatively,  constitutional  adjudica-
tion might be  informed  by knowledge  of what institutional  experi-
ences under different regimes suggest, negatively or positively, about
how the U.S.  regime  ought to  be  construed  in order  to  work  at  a
structural level.'9 Further, constitutional  adjudication  might consider
the weight or force of the reasoning of constitutional courts orjurists
elsewhere, as Justice Rehnquist's  1989 comments seem to suggest.  It
is the latter point in particular that I think meets the most resistance
in the U.S. cases.
Political Rights, art. 18, 999 U.N.T.S.  171; The International  Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial  Discrimination, opened  for signature  Mar. 7, 1966. S. EXEC.  DOC. C, 95-2, at 1
(1978),  660 U.N.T.S.  195; The Convention Against Torture  and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, openedfor  signature  Feb. 4, 1985, S. TREAiy Doc.  NO.  100-20
(1988),  23  I.LM.  1027,  as modifiA,  24  I.LNL  535;  ser also Universal  Declaration  of Human
Rights, GA. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 18, at 71, 74, U.N.  Doc. A/810  (1948);  f. Robin
West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan, - QUINNIPIAC  L  REV.  - (forthcoming 1999)  (arguing that
commitment to the rule of law should encourage egalitarian understandings of justice embod-
ied in law that are universal and that extend to people regardless of their nationalities or loca-
tions).
37  See, eg., Washington  v. Glucksberg,  521 U.S.  702,  718 n.16  (1997),  (where  Court. in an
opinion written by Rehnquist and joined by Scalia, relied in part on foreign constitutional deci-
sions denying that their constitutional bill of rights provisions  protected a right to assisted sui-
cide).
Compare Stanford  v. Kentucky,  492  U.S.  361, 364  n.1  (1989)  (rejecting  contention  that
sentencing guidelines of other countries are relevant to determination of 'evolving  standards of
decency")  with Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.  86,  126  (1958)  (Frankfurter  J., dissenting)  (arguing
that loss of citizenship is not cruel and unusual  punishment  because  civilized  nations use this
punishment).  Constitutions can explicity require  resort  to foreign  constitutional  law.  See S.
AFR.  CONST.  § 39(1) (b),  (c)  (1996)  (requiring  courts,  when  interpreting the  Bill of Rights,  to
consider international law, and authorizingcourts  to considerforeign law).
Thus, Justice Breyer argued unsuccessfully in Pnntz v. United Stats  the successful experi-
ence in other constitutional,  democratic federations suggested  that it was not necesmary  to con-
strue our Constitution to include  a non-commandeering  principle.  &e  521  U.S.  893,  976-78
(1997)  (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Adkins v. Children's  Hosp., 261  U.S. 525,  570-71  (1923)
(HolmesJ., dissenting) (arguing that experience in other nations, including Great Britain and
Australia, supported  the reasonableness,  and hence the constitutionality,  of a minimum wage
law for women that the Court held unconstitutional).  In contrast, otherJustices  haw  referred
to experience in other countries as bearing, negatively, on how the Constitution should be con-
strued.  See, ag., Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579. 593-94  (1952)  (Frankfurter,
J., concurring)  (referring implicidtly to fascist  dictatorships in Europe  as a reason  to constrain
presidential power even though it "is absurd  to see a dictator in a representative  product of the
sturdy democratic traditions of the Mississippi Valley"); id. at 641  (JacksonJ., concurring) (not-
ing negative example of George II  and "instruction from our own times'  of executive po-ers in
"totalitarian" governments).
Comparative  constitutional experience may also bear on issues of constitutional design or
amendment that occur outside of adjudicatory process, but the balance of this article will focus
on adjudication.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
II.  AMBIVALENT RESISTANCE:  WHYAND WHY NOT
In this  section,  I  describe  some  possible reasons for  the  Court's
ambivalence, including the shape and demands of legal education.  I
go on to  argue  that U.S. law schools, lawyers and jurists must aban-
don  their  ambivalence  about  learning  from  comparative  constitu-
tional  law,  even  if they conclude  that "borrowings" are  not helpful.
Comparison,  I suggest, has become  almost inevitable  in  the increas-
ingly  globalized  world  of law and information,  and  only  deliberate
study can yield the knowledge on which to base informed  analysis of
the  implicit  comparisons  that  are  entailed in  assertions  about  the
uniqueness of the U.S. Constitution.
A.  Why such ambivalence?
First,  the broader  history and  culture  of "American  exceptional-
ism,"  with  its twin manifestations  of idealism  and  naivete,  of expan-
sionism and isolationism, may affect those who serve on the Supreme
Court and in the federal  courts no  less than  those in other  govern-
ment service.41  The belief that the U.S. experience is unique can be
deployed to serve both "liberal" and "conservative"  views of constitu-
tional issues,  as  a  comparison  of Justice  Scalia's  stance  in  Printz v.
United States with that of the  dissenting justices  in Fong Yue  Ting v.
42 United States suggests.
Second,  for some  period of time  until fairly recently,  many U.S.
law  school  curriculums  have  had  a  decidedly  parochial  emphasis. 43
41  See Michael Kammen,  The United States Constitution,  Public Opinion, and  the Problem of  Amen-
can Exceptionalism, in THE UNITED  STATES CONSTITUTION:  ROOTS,  RIGHTS AND  RESPONSIBIIUTIES
(A.E. Dick Howard, et. al. 1992)  (noting the continued importance of exceptionalism  in Ameri-
can history generally and describing the longstanding role of public opinion in constitutional
adjudication).  On whether  "exceptionalism"  in national  histories  is  really  "exceptional,"  see
Carl Degler, In Pursuit of an American History, 92 AM.  HIST.  REV.  1 (1987)  (suggesting  impor-
tance  of understanding  "national character,"  and  arguing benefits  of comparative  historical
study so as to better understand what is "exceptional" about a particular nation's history).  For
an example of what might be regarded as nineteenth century British constitutional exceptional-
ism, see Bank of Toronto v. Lambe  [1887]  12 A.C. 575, 587  (Privy Council, reviewing Canadian
Supreme  Court decision,  and asserting  that U.S.  constitutional  cases  on federalism  are irrele-
vant  to the  interpretation  of the  British North  America Act).  For what  may  be  implicit  re-
sponses  of Canadian judges, see In re  Prohibiting Liquor Laws  [1894]  24 S.C.R.  170,  205,  231
(emphasizing intent of the Canadian framers to "devise a scheme by which the best features of
the Constitution of the United States of America, rejecting  the bad, should be engrafted upon
the British constitution  ...  ." and asserting the fundamentally Canadian character of the British
North America Act).
42 See supra  note 32 (noting their denial of the applicability of foreign practices to interpreta-
tion of U.S. constitutional law).
43  Legal training, to the extent it existed in law schools in the late eighteenth and early nine-
teenth centuries, may have been more "comparative"  than  those of the mid-twentieth  century.
Both Harvard and the University of Virginia, for example, included arguably  "comparative" of-
ferings as required courses in early days; at Virginia, international law (the "law of nations") was
required and at Harvard there appear to have been required lectures or courses in the civil law,
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the history of the common law, natural law and ecclesiastical  law.  SeJOwN RITICIE,  THE FIRST
HUNDRED  YEARS: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF  LAW 01 THE  UNIVERSITY  OF VIRGINA  FOR
THE PERIOD  1826-1926, at 11, 27-28, 64, 76-78, 104 (1978)  (also noting that first-year curriculum
included  international  law  as  recently  as  1925-26);  1  CHARLES  WARREN,  HSTORY  OF  THE
HARVARD  LAW  SCHOOL  303,  339, 355,  436-37  (1970).  When  the  first  U.S.  law schools  were
founded, many of the available legal materials were from  the British courts and treatise writers,
and inertia may have been responsible for their presence in the curriculum  for some time.  See
2 Warren supra  at 344 (reporting that in 1846-47 the Harvard "Catalogue stated:  'The course of
Instruction for the bar embraces the various branches of Public and Constitutional  Law, Admi-
ralty, Maritime, Equity and Common Law which are common to all the United  States, with oc-
casional  illustrations of Foreign Jurisprudence").  By  the  middle  of the  nineteenth  century.
however,  U.S.  materials were  increasingly available.  See I  WARREN,  supra, at 410  (noting ad-
vances in the creation of American  legal literature, including Chancellor Kent's Commentaries
by  1830); WILLIAM  P.  .PLAANA,  LOGIC  AND  ENPERIENCE  THE ORIGIN OF  MODERMN  AMERICAlN
LEGAL EDUCATION 59-60,  111  (1994)  (noting publication in  1870's of texts rel)ing less on Eng-
lish precedents and  more on cases  from American jurisdictions  and  works exposing fallacies
born of reliance on Roman legal concepts).
Compared  to other parts of the curriculum,  international  and comparative  offerings and
requirements appeared to be in relative decline in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury at Harvard Law School.  See  2 WARREN,  supra, at 411-12, 448 (displaying tables,  indicating
that the curriculum  in  1879-80  did not include  comparative  or foreign  law  nor did  first year
classes in 1891-92 include  civil law).  By  1900, Harvard's  curriculum was 'essentially  profession-
ally oriented," and was widely emulated,  ith only a few 'national  schools (that]  tried to be less
professional  than Harvard  by offering courses in such areas  as international  law, comparative
law and jurisprudence .... "  ROBERT STEVENS,  LAW  SCHOOL:  LEGAL EDLr\TION  IN  AMERICA
FROM THE 1850s TO THE  1980s, at 39  (1983);  see id. at 48 n.39, n.41  (reporting  also that after
1899, international  law was offered at Harvard  only "sporadically'); set also LkPwaA.  supra, at
129-30  (describing Harvard Law faculty's unwillingness  to support University of Chicago's  de-
sire to offer such "nonlegal" subjects as comparative  politics, European  political  theory and ad-
ministrative law);  cf.  Brainerd Currie,  The Aateials of Law Study, 3J. LEGAL  EDuC.  331,  363-67,
374-83  (1951)  (describing Harvard's influence  in professionalizing study of law despite efforts
at, for instance, Columbia and Yale to revitalize connections between law and other disciplines).
According  to Stevens,  Harvard  had  the  greatest  influence  on  other  university)afliliated  law
school curricula during this time,  see id. at 35-72,  and  the standard  "core curriculum" of the
1920s,  developed under  Harvard's  influence,  included neither  comparative  nor international
law.  See STEVENS,  supra, at 41 n.49; but cf.  id.  at 49 n.43 (noting that Yale offered secondyear
lectures on international  law, comparative jurisprudence, Roman  law, ecclesiastical  law  and po-
litical economy).  Intellectual  changes in the law also  may have  played a role in the decline  of
comparative  and international course  requirements and offerings  relative to other parts of the
legal curriculum.  With the decline of natural law and its more universal  approach to law's con-
tent and the rise of positivism as a basic jurisprudential  outlook, it would not be surprising for
legal educators who view law as the command of a legitimate sovereign to believe that law stu-
dents should concentrate on the decisions and laws  of their own jurisdiction.  Cf.  L,PNA.  su-
pra,  at 77 (linking  Austin's positivism to Langdell's development of the case method).
As one moves on in the twentieth century, the tremendous developments  in public law and
the rise of  "functionalism" and of legal realism, bore a complex relationship to law school cur-
ricula in international and comparative  public law.  Stevens  quotes a description of law school
curricula in the late 1940s as being "fairly well  standardized... [with]  curricula..,  fashioned
largely around the subjects in which the graduates of the school  must be examined for admis-
sion to practice...." Id. at 210 (quoting ABA Survey of the Legal  Profession in late  1940s).  In
1948 only 35 percent of AALS member schools offered courses  in international  law  see JOHN
KI'G GAMBLE, TEACHING  INTERNATIONAL  LAW IN  THE 1990s  121  (1992),  and a smaller number
appear to have  offered  comparative  law, see Joseph  Dainow,  Teading Methods  for Comparatue
Law, 3J.  LEGAL EDUC. 388, 395 (1951)  (stating that "as many as 26"  law schools were then offer-
ing comparative  law out of the then 107 AALS members reported by Warren Seavcy,  ITte  Assn of
American Law School in Rerospect 3J. LEGAL EDL'C.  153, 168 (1950)).  Yet, in the immediate post-
World War II era, many law schools showed renewed interest in courses on global issues, and inJOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Even  today, few if any require study of international  or comparative
law,  and while  rates of enrollment in such courses  appear  to be  on
the  rise,  they  remain  at  some  law schools  a  marginalized  area  of
study.
44
In his speech discussed  earlier, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested
that until after World War II, the only materials available to consult in
judicial  constitutional  decision-making  were  domestic; 4  thus  in  the
area  of constitutional  law,  there were  no other games  in town.  Per-
haps it is more accurate to say, however, that of foreign decisions that
might have been viewed as constitutional, few were seen as relevant to
topics addressed by U.S. courts."  Indeed what judges viewed  as avail-
comparative  law.  See STEVENS,  supra,  at 222 n.42 (noting postwar pressure at the larger schools
for emphasis on international  and comparative  law);  see also GAMBLE, supra,  at 123 (noting that
by the  1950s about 60 percent of law schools had some  provision for international  offerings);
LAURA KALMAN,  LEGAL REAuSM  ATYALE 1927-1960,  at 154 (1986)  (noting increased offerings in
late 1940s in public and international law at Yale as reflecting the interest of Yale legal realists in
social policy). As early as the 1920s, some legal realists at Columbia had urged a "broad concep-
tion ofjurisprudence as encompassing  legal philosophy, ancient law, legal history and compara-
tive law," and expanded electives  in comparative law.  See KALMAN,  supra, at 72.  In 1949-50,  Co-
lumbia University adopted a plan that required students to take minimum numbers  of hours in
five subject  groups, requirements  that included at least two hours from  a group including in-
ternational and comparative law and the legal profession.  See STEVENS, supra,  at 224 n.52.  Har-
vard, in the 1950s, expanded its offerings in international law and comparative  law.  SeeARTHUR
E.  SUTHERLAND,  THE  LAW  AT  HARVARD:  A  HISTORY OF  IDEAS AND  MEN,  1817-1967,  at 332-36
(1967).  In the postwar period, McDougal  and Lasswell  offered a course  at Yale on "The World
Community and Law,"  investigating "the conditions under which the peoples of the world  can
be  brought to a fuller consciousness  and understanding  of their interdependence  so that they
would  reshape  their institutions  accordingly."  KALMAN,  supra, at 181.  Yet,  the  McDougal-
Lasswell approach  to law as  policy science had less influence  elsewhere  than might have  been
expected.  See id at 184-85;  STEVENS, supra,  at 265-66.
..  For a survey of international law  teaching in  the United Stated  and Canada in the early
1990s, and a description of other surveys of international law offerings, see  GAMBLE,  supra note
43, at 1-37,  118-25,  134-39 (demonstrating long concern  by internationalist scholars about offer-
ings and enrollments in international law courses,  and showing that by early  1990s, more  than
95%  of law schools  had such  offerings  but that there had been  much less growth in the  per-
centage of students enrolling in such courses, from 25%  in  1912 to 45% in  1991).  I  am aware
of no U.S.  law school that currently requires students  to complete  a course  in comparative  or
international  law to earn aJ.D. degree. According to the on-line course catalogues  of the Uni-
versity of California  at Berkeley, University of Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Duke,  Georgetown,
Harvard, Michigan, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, Stanford, Virginia, and
Yale, for instance,  the schools offer many courses  in international  and comparative  law, but do
not require  study in those fields.  (A list of citations  to these on-line catalogues as of March  9,
1999  is on file with  U. PA.J. CONST. L.).  See also GAMBLE,  supra  note  43, at 4,  22,  123 (stating
that the "survey course in public international law..,  is never required," in contrast to the year
1912, when 25 percent of U.S. law schools required a course in international  law).
SeeRehnquist, supra  note 12, at 411-12.
46 In  evaluating Rehnquist's analysis, bear in mind that by the 1880's the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Privy Council in London were issuing decisions interpreting the power-allocating
clauses  of the  British North America Act  [BNA],  the first Canadian  constitution,  adopted  in
1867.  By 1949, Canada's Supreme Court was exercising final jurisdiction over questions arising
under the BNA,  an Act that largely addressed  allocations of power between  the national  and
provincial governments, but which  also addressed some minority religious  and linguistic issues.
See  DALE  GIBSON,  THE  LAW  OF  THE  CHARTER:  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES  6-8  (1986);  RICHARD  E.
JOHNSTON,  THE  EFFECT  OF JUDICIAL  REVIEW  ON  FEDERAL-STATE  RELATIONS  IN  AUSTRALIA,
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able and relevant may itself reflect "exceptionalist" understandings of
the U.S.  Constitution.
Since  World War  II, a number  of constitutional  courts,  perhaps
most  prominently  the  German  Federal  Constitutional  Court,  have
developed  important  bodies  of jurisprudence  addressing  constitu-
tional issues similar to those presented in the United States; of these,
only a small number are routinely available in English.  Furthermore,
in  those  countries  that  have  developed  constitutions  and  constitu-
tional court decisions,  the constitutions  themselves  are  typically  the
product of the latter part of the century.  These constitutions are of-
ten longer than, and include provisions different from those of U.  S.
Constitution.  Understanding  the  constitutional  context  of foreign
decision-making  is  a daunting  task,  made  no  less  so  by  the  length
and, in some respects,  unfamiliarity of the basic  constitutional  texts.
Finally,  important  differences  exist  between  the  U.S.  constitutional
system  and  those  of  other  leading  producers  of English-accessible
CN  ¢ADA AND  THE UNrnD STATES  (1969).  Moreover, Australia  began generating constitutional
decisions on federalism issues in the early years of this century.  For evidence of academic atten-
tion to Australia's early constitutional developments, see Charles Grone HainesJuduzal  intrpre-
tation of the Constitution  Act of Australia, 30 HARV.  L  REv. 597  (1917).  In  the 1930s and  1940s,
Justice Frankfurter referred  to Canadian and Australian  decisions  in  cases involving  intergov-
ernmental  immunities.  See supra note 4  (discussing Frankfurter's  dissenting and  concurring
opinions in  U.S. v. Allegheny and Graves v. New  York ex rel.  OKeefe, respectively).  It thus seems
overly simple to suggest that it has not been until recently  that there  was  a sufficient  body of
constitutional decisions from other courts that could have been helpful  to U.S. courts.
However, whether  the federal systems of these three countries are so analogous that deci-
sions in one sytem bear directly on  the corct result in another, as Frankfurter suggested,  see
supra  note 4, is somewhat doubtful.  While all three nations were  designed to have federal  s)--
tems, Canada's federation was designed, in the heat of the U.S.  Civil War, to establish a stronger
national government than that of the United States, an intention clearly frustrated by decisions,
led by  the Privy  Council, substantially restricting  the scope of national  power.  See generally,
PETER W. HOGG,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LiW OF CANADA  97-112  (3d ed.  1992)  [hereinafter  HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  OF CANADA].  Although Australia's  federalist arrangements  were  more
closely modeled on those of the United States, the specific constitutional allocations of power to
the federal and provincial governments in both Canada and Australia differ from those  of the
U.S.  Constitution in some significant ways.  Canada, for example, allocates criminal  law entirely
to its national legislative competence.  See CAN.  CONST.  (Constitution Act 1867) pt. VI § 91(27).
In Australia, the  national government has  power to make  laws for marriage,  divorce and  cus-
tody.  SeeAUSTL  CONST. Acr  § 51 (.xxi),  (xxii).  Yet, in Canada, Australia, and the United States
there are more general issues of federalism in constitutional  adjudication, on which wisdom  is
not likely to be localized exclusively in one country's jurisprudence.  For instance, on whether
enumerated  federal  powers should be construed  broadly in favor of strong central  power, or
more narrowly in order to preserve realms of provincial or state power, compare Attozey  Cn.
for Ont. v. Attorney  Gen. for Can.  [1896]  A.C.  348  (Privy  Council  reverses  Canadian  Supreme
Court to hold that federal power to "regulate" trade did not include power to "prohibit- trade)
and Rex v. Barger (1908)  6 C.LR. 41,  78 (implied prohibition doctrine in Australia)  with  Umted
States v. Daly, 312 U.S.  100  (1941)  (holding that power to regulate commerce includes power
to prohibit) and  Missouri v. Holland  252 U.S.  416, 433-34  (1920)  (dismissing  "inisible radia-
tions" from powers reserved  to states as  constraints  on federal treaty power).  Having said  all
this, Chief Justice Rehnquist's  point about  the rapid development  of constitutional  law since
World War II in other nations is widely shared.  See MAURO  CGPELLETrl &  WILMIM  COHE.N ,
COMPARATvE CONSTITUTIONAL Lw 13-16  (1979)  (noting the explosive growth of constitutions
andjudicial review since World War II).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
opinions  (for example,  the rules against "abstract" review under  the "case  or controversy" regime),  as well  as in the style and accessibility
of opinions written in other constitutional systems.1
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Some of the  reasons for resistance  to comparative  constitutional
learning, however, are in the process  of changing.  Interest in inter-
national and  comparative  courses  is  on the  rise,  as  law practice  be-
comes more globalized.  Availability of foreign decisions is increasing.
Likewise,  the  rate  of U.S.  research  in  and  publication  on  issues  of
comparative  constitutionalism  is increasing,  as  this symposium  illus-
trates.48 And U.S. judges are participating in a variety of international
organizations  and educational  programs which promote  exposure  to
other constitutional systems.
47 Thus,  for example,  decisions of the  French  Conseil Constitutionnel,  even  when  trans-
lated, are sometimes  difficult for those accustomed  to  U.S. opinions  to understand,  with terse
paragraphs succeeding  each  other in a not always  easy to follow narrative.  For discussion  of
French judicial  discourse, see Mitchel de S.-O.- I'E. Lasser, 'Lit Theory' Put to the Test: A  Compara-
tive Literary Analysis of  American Judicial  Tests and French  Judicial  Discourse, 111  HARV.  L.  REV.  689
(1998);  Mitchel  de  S.-O.-I'E.  Lasser, Judicial  (Self-) Portraits:  Judicial  Discourse in the French Legal
System,  104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995).  Reliance  on treatises  by legal scholars is far more common
in European systems  and thus the materials  of comparison  and discussion  themselves appear
unfamiliar.  For a recent example of the attitude of some U.S. judges to treatises and law  review
articles,  see Dolan v.  City of Tigard,  512 U.S. 374,  392  (1994)  (noting in a tone of implicit  criti-
cism that "Justice Stevens' dissent relies upon a law review article for" a certain proposition).
48 A  LEXIS search  for law review  articles  referring to the key  language in Section  1 of the
Canadian  Charter  ("demonstrably justified  in  a  free  and  democratic  society")  from  1990
through 1997 yielded 69 articles in U.S. lawjournals.  A LEXIS search  of U.S. Supreme Court
opinions  for  references  to  the Canadian  Supreme  Court yielded  21  cases  (not counting one
disbarment petition), of which  seven were  decided after 1980; only one of these,  Washington v.
Glucksberg,  521  U.S. 702  (1997),  involved reference  to the Canadian  Supreme  Court's decisions
in  a majority opinion on a constitutional issue.
4  My  sense  is that in the  last ten years,  there  has  been an  increase  in U.S. judges'  travel
abroad to meet with their counterparts, and likewise a substantial influx in the other direction,
fueled in some measure by the emergence of new regimes in Eastern and  Central Europe  and
the  constitutional  revolution  in  South  Africa.  Review  by the  author  of financial  disclosure
statements of the U.S. Supreme  Court justices  between  1992-97  (available  on request through
the  Administrative  Office  of the  U.S.  courts)  reveals  that most of the justices  reported  reim-
bursement for some international  travel for educational  purposes during  this time period,  and
several justices report regular international  trips for educational  purposes in the summer.  As
further  evidence  of increasing  opportunities  for judicial interchange,  consider the  following
examples.  In October, 1994, the U.S.Judicial Conference  established a permanent Committee
on International Judicial Relations, designed  to review and assist exchange  programs offered  to
representative  foreign legal systems and their counterparts  in the United States.  See Reports  of
the Proceedings of the  Judicial  Conference of the United StatesJudicial  Conference  Comm. on
Int'l Judicial  Relations  36, 60  (Sept. 20,  1993);  see also Report of the Ad Hoc  Comm.  on Int'l
Judicial  Relations  4-5  (Sept. 1993)  (in recommending  that  committee  become  permanent,
notes interest in international judicial  relations and judicial interest in "education  on civil  law
systems ofjustice and on the interaction between federal jurisprudence  and international  trea-
ties and conventions").  In June, 1995, the First Worldwide Common  LawJudiciary Conference
was held  in Williamsburg,  Virginia and Washington  D.C.  SeeJustices, Judges from Common Law
Countries Meet in Williamsburg and Washington, INT'LJUDICIAL  OBSERVER,  September,  1995, at  1.
The second  such conference  was held in May,  1997, in Washington,  D.C.,  and included  U.S.
federal judges and representatives from ten  common law  nations.  See Judges from Ten  Common
Law Countries Meet in Washington  for  Five Day Conference, INT'LJUDICIAL OBSERVER,June,  1997, at
1.  In  October,  1995,  the  Organization  of Supreme  Courts  of the Americas  was  created  as  a
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Yet, accessibility  and interest alone  do  not fully  explain  the  am-
bivalence  about looking  to other constitutional  systems for illumina-
tion of shared  constitutional  problems.  Other divides,  and  reasons
for caution in borrowing constitutional  ideas from one system  to an-
other, are likely to remain.  The differences between  the U.S.  Consti-
tution and the  constitutions of other western  democracies  are  sub-
stantial, not only in the organization of the court systems that resolve
constitutional  questions, but also  in the relatively  unusual  nature  of
the U.S. "presidential" system  of allocating  executive  and  legislative
power.  The interplay between these allocations of power and the sys-
tem of federalism in the United States makes analogies to any of the
other major constitutional  systems complex and difficult.  And differ-
ences  in  history, culture,  population  composition  and distribution,
political parties and voting systems,  further and substantially compli-
cate the process even of understanding  the operation of other consti-
tutional systems, let alone "borrowing" from them.
One difficulty in using comparative constitutional study to identify
areas for potential  "borrowing" is in determining when  foreign  con-
stitutional law reflects alternative  ways of understanding familiar con-
cepts and problems, such as  due process of law, or enumerated  and
limited powers, that give rise to interpretive questions.  Comparative
study can yield insights into the sense of "false necessity"  internal  to
one legal system.  As Justice Breyer argued in  Printz v.  United States,"'
given that some countries find it important to safeguard  the right of
sub-national  units  to administer national  law, it is hard  to conclude
that, in order to have a successful  and continuing federal  division of
powers,  a national  government  must be  prohibited from  requiring
sub-national  units  to do  so.  At these  moments  of possible  insight,
however, one is faced with the harder problem of distinguishing false
necessities for a given constitutional  system from  aspects of the system
that may be true necessities in light of the  (some would say inevitable)
interdependencies  of the parts of the whole?' For example,  had Jus-
tice Scalia  responded on the  merits  to Justice  Breyer's  reference  to
the structure  of other  federal  systems,  he  might  have  argued  that
other differences between German and U.S. federalisms  preclude  re-
liance  on Germany's  emphasis  on the  15.nder  administration  of fed-
eral law in determining what the U.S. rule should be.  The symbolic
meaning  of sub-national  administration  of federal  law  in  Germany
permanent institutional  link between  the judiciahies  of the Americas,  with a focus  on judicial
education.  See Justices,  Judges  from Across Western Hemisplure  Assemble,  Create Cartyfor  New Orgarn-
zation of  Supreme Courts,  INT'LJUDICIAL OBSERV., January,  1997, at 1.  And  te Fourth Interna-
tional judicial Conferences forJustices of Supreme Courts and Constitutional  Courts %%s  held
in 1996 at the Federal Judicial  Center in Washington, D.C.  S&e Major  IntlJudL  Conf. to MLt nm
Washinton, INT'LJUD. OBSERVER, Sept. 1996, at 1.
5  See521 U.S. 898,976-78  (1997)  (BreyerJ. dissenting).
51  For a thoughtful theoretical elaboration, see  Mark Tushnet, Rturning  IlSth  Interest: Obvr-
vations on Some Putative  Benefits of  Studying Constitutional  Lau. 1 U. PA.J. Co.xs.  L  325 (1998).JOURNAL OF  CONSTTU7TIONAL LAW
differs substantially from that in the  United States."  So,  too, do  the
mechanisms  for lUnder influence  in the  national  legislative  process:
members of the lUnder governments sit in the  Bundesrat to exercise
constitutionally-secured  and  judicially-enforceable  political  powers
over  legislation  that the linder will  then  have  to  administer;1 3  this
power  differs  substantially  from the  less  direct influences  state  gov-
ernments have upon the U.S. Congress and may be a structural  pro-
tection against undue burdens  of administration  in  Germany  that is
lacking in the U.S constitutional system.
A final  obstacle to constitutional borrowing  may be worth noting,
one that is reflected in the self-consciously  normative mode of analy-
sis found in many Canadian and German decisions.  Perhaps because
they  are far  more  recently  adopted,  decisions  about  these  constitu-
tions are often  less concerned with  original intentions than  some of
the current decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.5  German  constitu-
tional  court decisions  often begin  their reasoning with  a basic,  fun-
damental norm,  not particularly  tied to a specific  constitutional  text,
and proceed in their reasoning from the abstract principle to the de-
52  In Germany subnational administration  of federal laws is understood  as one of the rights
of the Lnder and as part of a relationship  of trust among the federal and subnational govern-
ments;  in the United  States, it is perceived  as  a federal  imposition  on  the states.  See sources
cited infra note 53.
5  See generally DONALD  KOMMERS,  THE  CONSTITUTIONAL  JURISPRUDENCE  OF  THE  FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY  69-75, 82-83, 96-102  (2d ed.  1997); DAVID  P. CURRIE,  THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE  FEDERAL REPUBLIC  OF  GERMANY  61-66  (1994).  Note that unlike  members  of the  U.S.
Senate, who are popularly elected  to that position, the members of the Bundesrat are represen-
tatives of the lUnder governments.  The German Basic Law also contemplates "financial equali-
zation" laws  (with the consent of the Bundesrat),  designed to "ensure a reasonable equalization
of the financial disparity  of the lUnder, due account  being  taken of the financial  capacity  and
requirements  of the municipalities...."  BASIC LAW FOR  THE FEDERAL  REPUBLIC OF GERMANY,
ArL  107  (d)  (Official  translation  revised  March  1995).  The Basic  Law specifies  that  eligible
LUnder are those "whose per capita revenue from Land taxes and from income and corporation
tax is below the average of all the lander combined."  Id. at Art. 107(1).  These features, as well,
may affect evaluation  of the significance  of the role of 15.nder administration  of federal  law in
Germany.
In light of distinctive features  of each system, similar questions could be raised  about the
relevance of Canadian or Australian federalism decisions.  For example, in neither Australia nor
Canada did the states or provinces (at least through mid century) preserve  as much  autonomy
and power to raise their own taxes as did those of the United States, but rather relied on nego-
tiated  payments from the federal government to provide the subnational units with real budg-
ets.  See generallyJOHNSTON, supra  note 46, at 119-57.  There may be reciprocal relationships be-
tween  greater  national  power  over  taxes  and  more  restrictive  interpretations  of regulatory
powers that ought to caution against ready borrowing of doctrine concerning the latter in  a sys-
tern that has preserved more fiscal autonomy to its subnational units.
5  The obvious connection between chronology and originalist interpretation  is that the far-
ther away from original drafting one is, the less consensus,  the less in the way of shared  under-
standings  will exist about what was and  was not meant,  and the  more  there will  be  to argue
about.  For elaboration  of this, and other less obvious connections, see  Eivind Smith,  Introduc.
tion  to CONSTITUTIONAL  JUSTICE  UNDER  OLD  CONSTITUTIONS  (Eivind  Smith,  ed.  1995)  and
other essays in this collection,  especially those  by Francis Delp~re, Frank Michelman,  and  Mi-
chel Troper.
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cision at hand.  U.S. constitutional decisions are more likely to begin
with a precedent, or a statement of facts.57
We in the United States are in a long-continuing period of unease
over the Court's authority as an institution to assert bold principles or
normative values.  Those  constitutional  courts  that speak  and  inter-
pret on behalf of younger  constitutional  orders,  however,  may  feel
themselves to be speaking to a different  generation  of constitutional
problems  than the U.S. Court faces.  For one thing, the judicial re-
view functions of newer constitutional courts are often expressly  pro-
vided for in their constitutional documents.  The interpretive difficul-
ties for a court faced  with  an  old and seldom-amended  document
differ from  those  of constitutional  courts  populated  by  persons  for
whom the drafting of the basic law is within their personal memories,
or those of their immediate  teachers."s  In societies with newer consti-
tutions, there may be broader areas of consensus, born of knowledge
of the  process of constitution-making,  that function  to  constrain,  or
to legitimize decisions in ways not available  to the U.S. Court.  None-
theless,  as  the  Canadian  experience  demonstrates,  issues  of the  le-
gitimacy and the scope ofjudicial activism and of deference  to legisla-
tive judgments can emerge early even  in new constitutional  systems."
These controversies  illuminate,  if nothing else, the  tensions between
democratic  self-government,  on  the  one  hand,  and  judicially-
enforced adherence  to  constitutional  norms, on the other, that have
concerned U.S. constitutionalists.
See,  &g.,  1975  German  Abortion  Decision,  translated  in  DO.ALD  P.  Ko.t.%IERS, THE
CONSTuTIONALJURISPRUDENCE  OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF  GER.L,,.%v 349 (1989)  (analyzing
abortion issue in light of fundamental value of protection of human life).  Cf.  Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S.  113 (1973)  (analyzing abortion in light of history, practice and precedent).
57  In part this may be due to the common law feature of constitutional adjudication so apty
described  in  David  Strauss,  Common  Law  Constitutional Adjudication, 63  U. CIIL L  REV.  877
(1996).
SeeJOHNSTON,  supra note 46,  at 239  (arguing that earlier interpretations of die BMA  by
the  Canadian  Supreme Court were more  receptive  to national power  than  those of the Privy
Council because "members of the early Court were judges for whom federation had been a per-
sonal experience,  and they knew well the  purposes for  which  the  union  had  been  consum-
mated").  See  also PatrickJ. Monahan,  The  Charter Then and Now,  in PROTECriNG  RIGHTS  AND
FREEDOts 105  (Philip Bryden, et. al., eds., 1994)  (arguing that public debate and lobb)ing over
the Canadian Charter in the period 1980-82  had effect of  sending message tojudges to take the
document seriously as a constraint on legislative action).
59  Compare  DON STUART,  CHARTERJUSTICE IN  CANADIAN  CRIlm%,L LW 18-19  (2d  ed.  1996)
(criticizing  inconsistency and  laxness  of the Canadian  Court's recent decisions  applying  the
proportionality  test as a cause for concern)  andJamie Cameron, The Past, Present, and Future of
ExpresiveFreedom Under the Charter,  35 OSGOODE HALL L.J.  1.55,  67 (1997)  (criticizing subjectiv-
ity  of Canadian  Court's section 1 analysis in free expression  cases and arguing for a return to
fundamental  assumption of Oakes that any infringement of Charter rights  must be  taken  seri-
ously under Section 1) with Monahan,  supra  note 58. at 117  (praising the Court's approach  as
deferential and "resist[ing] the temptation to install  itself as a kind of 'super legislature")  and
Pierre Blache,  The Criteria  ofJustification under  Oakes:  Too Mudh Sevrrit  Generated Through Forw.at-
ism, 20  MANITOBA  LJ.  437, 438, 450  (1991)  (arguing that the Court has engaged  in  "prudent
revisionism" of the Oakes test and is better in moving towards more open balancing).
60  See David Beatty, Law and Politics, 44 A.iM. J. COMP. L  131  (1996)  (arguing that constitu-JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
B.  Why we should abandon ambivalence
as to the study of comparative  constitutional  materials
Having said all this, let me suggest one reason, among many oth-
ers,6'  that we should not be  ambivalent  about learning  more  about
constitutional  decisions  and  practices  outside  the  United  States  -
whatever use we may or may not make of this knowledge.2
Comparison is inevitable.  We cannot help but draw on compari-
sons with other systems  in understanding and giving meaning to  our
own.  At least in the late twentieth century, news and communication
media,  as  well  as  professional journals,  bombard  those  who  hold
power or authority  in the United States legal  community  with  infor-
mation about what is happening not only in the United States, but in
many countries around the world and in international legal  regimes.
When Justice Scalia asserts that U.S. federalism  is uniquely American,
he is  making an implicit comparison  to  other systems and  asserting
that there is no other system like that of the United States.  When the
majority in Fong Yue  Ting v.  United States invoked  the universal  prac-
tice  of sovereigns,  as well  as when the  dissenters  invoked  the irrele-
vance of foreign practice  to U.S. constitutional law, each was making
an implicit comparison.6"  We  cannot wholly  prevent ourselves  from
being influenced by what we  think we  know about other countries -
in thinking about how rigorous are the standards  for impeachment,
whether  racial distinctions by the government are  ever permitted, or
whether hate speech should be criminally punished or judicially pro-
tected6  - what we think we  know about the world forms part of the
tional scholars in many countries perceive  a tension between  popular sovereignty and judicial
enforcement of entrenched rights).  Some  qualified praise emerges  in the Canadian  literature
for the Court's steering a middle course between these  two (at times)  contradictory values.  See,
e.g., Andre LaJoie and Henry Quillinan,  The Supreme Court  Judges' Views of the Role of the Courts in
the Application of the Charter,  in PROTECTING  RIGHTS AND  FREEDOMS,  supra note 58, at  101  (sug-
gesting that the role of the Chief Judge  in applying proportionality review under section  1 of
Charter is to maintain formal appearance of unified, objective  approach to Charter interpreta-
tion even in the face of different interpretations of facts).
61 See Mark  Tushnet,  The Possibility of  Comparative Constitutional Law, 108  YALE  L.J.  1225
(1999)  for a discussion  of a number  of other possible  benefits  of comparative  constitutional
stud.
The "we" here refers to those who purport to speak with authority or power on the char-
acter and content of U.S. constitutional law  (whether judges, legislators,  lawyers, teachers,  stu-
dents or citizens.
Compare Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.  698, 711  (1893)  (implicitly comparing
the powers of other nations by holding that it is an "inherent and inalienable right of every sov-
ereign and independent nation" to exclude or expel aliens)  with id. at 737  (Brewer, J.  dissent-
ing)  ("governments  of other nations have elastic powers - ours is fixed and bounded by a writ-
ten constitution")  and id. at 757-58  (Field, J.  dissenting)  (arguing that the United States "takes
nothing" from the cruel and barbaric practices of Europe).
To elaborate  one of these  examples: In  the recent controversy concerning  the possible
impeachment of President Clinton, some have advanced arguments that part of the reason why
the standard for impeachment  needs to be very high  is because  the U.S. system  is not one of
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lattice  work  of assumptions  and  beliefs  that  constitute,  "our  tradi-
tions," "common sense," or "contemporary understandings"."'
My point in referring  to "what we think we  know" is  that we  im-
plicitly think we know many things about what is "necessary" to make
the U.S. Constitution work the way we think it "should" or "%as  sup-
posed to" and some of the assumptions on which this knowledge rests
have to do with what we are and are not supposed to be.  A basic and
still valuable  lesson from Freud  is  that becoming aware of our  own
experiences, assumptions and beliefs - making what is obscure visible
and what is latent manifest - enables us to use our rational, analytical
skills to make better sense out of what we should do in  the future.6
Whether  or not we  conclude  on  reasoned  reflection  that practices
elsewhere  suggest  answers  for U.S.  constitutional  questions,  we are
more likely to be able to monitor and control how much our assump-
tions about foreign views and practices influence  our thinking if we
become aware  of those assumptions - and this  is a benefit of actually
studying comparative constitutional law.
In sum, comparison is inevitable.  In formulating answers  to U.S.
constitutional  questions, an implicit  part of our arguing  about and
deciding  these  questions  has  to  do  with  assumptions  of what  U.S.
constitutionalism  is about and what  it requires;  and  this analysis  in-
volves an implicit comparison  with other forms of constitutionalism.
If comparison is (or is becoming) inevitable, then comparison should
be conscious, knowing, well-informed, and reasoned.ee
parliamentary governance.  The comparison  may be illuminating, but it is also more complex
than may at first appear.  The first level of analysis would note that in a parliamentary system, if
the Prime Minister does not survive a confidence vote, new elections are required  and the peo-
ple then have  the chance to express their will at the polls.  Under the U.S. presidential system.
by contrast, elections are  held at the  end of fixed  4 year terms,  which  the elected  President
serves out unless  he is  found to have  committed an impeachable  offense.  If the President  is
removed from office by impeachment, there are no new elections held but the office is taken
over by someone elected or appointed to a different position.  The anti-democratic  possibilities
of impeachment,  therefore, argue for a high standard for defining impeachable offenses.  Sec-
ond, note that in a parliamentary system with  two or three strong political  parties,  the Prime
Minister will have  the support of a majority party in the elected assembly, and thus may be less
likely to develop the kind of conflict with  that body that is more common  in a presidential sys-
tem, where a President may be from one party and the Congress  dominated  by another.  If a
President has lost the confidence  of a majority of the Congress  and the people, without some
means to remove him from office, the country could be hobbled in its governance.  Some might
argue, then, that the standard of impeachment should not be set at so high a level  as to make
impossible  effective  governance.  Third,  note the  importance  of understanding  the  conse-
quences of different structures of executive-legislative  relations and the number and nature  of
political parties active on the national scene.  Within the limits of a footnote  the point is only
that comparisons can be illuminating but are very complex.
For an introduction  to the  literature  on constitutional  interpretation,  see  GEOFn"EV  R.
STONE Er. AL.,  CONSTrrtTIONAL LAW 37-46, 785-95 (3d ed., 1996).
See ERRar.S  WALLWORK,  PSYCHOANALYSIS  AND  ETHIcs  64-65  (1991)  (Freud's  therapeutic
goal was to make ...  unconscious hidden meanings 'articulate'" to increase patient's freedom).
Thus, as noted earlier, whenjustice Frankfurter invoked the similarity in federal structure
of Canada and Australia to the United States, he may well have been in error.  &rz  supra notes 4
and 46  (discussingJustice Frankfurter's reliance  on Australian  and Canadian  decisions on in-JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
III.  PROPORTIONALITYAND  COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A brief look at the  concept  of "proportionality" in constitutional
law, both outside the United States and in recent U.S. Supreme Court
opinions,  will illuminate  some  of the  benefits  (and limitations)  of
comparative  constitutional  learning.  Since  1994, the  U.S. Supreme
Court has articulated  a "proportionality" test in  two  different  consti-
tutional  fields.68  Most recently,  in Flores, the  Court invoked propor-
tionality  to measure  the  constitutionality  of exercises  of Congress's
Section  5  powers  under the Fourteenth Amendment. 69  Specifically,
the Court there held that Congress's use of its remedial powers under
Section  5  must be  proportional  to  or  congruent  with  the  constitu-
tional harm sought to be remedied, and held that a recently-enacted
federal statute  was unconstitutional  because  it failed the  test of pro-
portionality. While no reference  is made to support the Court's invo-
cation  of considerations  of proportionality,  no Justice  explicitly  dis-
sented  from  the  majority's  use  of  the  concept.7
0  Yet,  the  most
immediate scholarly responses  to  the Hores proportionality  test were
negative, treating Fores'  invocation of "proportionality" as a novel, in-
determinate and unwise innovation.7
'  This response, from a perspec-
tergovernmental  tax issues and the possible inaccuracy of his assumption  of similarity).  Moreo-
ver, as  I discuss  below,  the  Breyer-Scalia  interchange  in  Printz v.  United States, 521  U.S.  898
(1997)  suggests the importance of broad knowledge of other systems, as well as of their particu-
lar structures, for evaluating the "transplantability" of practices from elsewhere; it also suggests
the importance of understanding the context of which such practices are always only a part.  See
supra  notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
See City of Boerne v. Flores,  521  U.S.  507  (1997)  (holding  that exercises  of Congress's
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment  must be proportional  to constitutional
violations sought to be prevented  or remedied); Dolan v. City  of Tigard,  512 U.S. 374,  388-91
(1994)  (holding  that, where  the  nature  and  costs  of  a condition  for permission  to  make
changes  to real property are not roughly proportional  to the nature  and impact of the change
progosed, an unconstitutional "taking" of property may be found).
See Rores, 521  U.S.  at 518.  Section  5 authorizes  Congress by all appropriate  measures  to
enforce  the provisions of Section  1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, including its guarantee  of
equal protection and due process.  Acting under Section  5, Congress has, for example, enacted
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, upheld in South Carolina  v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301  (1966).  For
discussion of the statute at issue in Rores,  see infra text accompanying notes  184-188.
70  See Rores, 521 U.S. at 544  (O'ConnorJ., dissenting) (agreeing with  the majority that scope
of Congress's  Section 5  powers turn on congruence and  proportionality between  injury  to be
prevented  or remedied  and means  adopted  to that end,  but arguing  that  Smith v. Employment
Division, 494 U.S. 872  (1990),  was wrongly decided); see id. at 565 (Souter,J., dissenting)  (argu-
ing that, in light  of doubts about  the  Smith, the  case  should be  reargued).  The  closest any
member of the Court came to questioning the proportionality test, albeit implicitly, was a short,
cryptic  dissenting opinion  by Justice  Breyer.  See id. at 566  (Breyer, J.,  dissenting)  (noting that
he joined all but one paragraph ofJustice O'Connor's dissent - the paragraph summarized in
the parenthetical  above  - and  reserving  his own  views  on  the  proper method  of Section  5
analysis).
See David Cole,  The Value of  Seeing Things Differently, 1997 Sup. CT.  REV.  31, 47  (noting that
proportionality standards "provide little if any principled guidance");John T. Noonan, Jr., Relig-
ious Liberty at Stake, 84 VA.  L. REv.  459,  470-71  (1998)  (criticizing proportionality  test as  "ex-
traordinary," unsupported by precedent and inconsistent with  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17  U.S. (4
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five  internal  to  U.S.  constitutional  decisions,  is  perhaps not surpris-
ing.'  U.S.  constitutional law does not ordinarily and explicitly resort
to the idea of proportionality as a measure of constitutionality - even
in the Eighth Amendment area,n where the constitutional  text seems
to call for application of the idea of proportionality,7 an idea that was
developed in early legal writings about criminal  punishments.7 m  Pro-
fessor Stuntz has recently suggested  that the failure  to  develop  pro-
portionality  analysis in constitutional  review of criminal law  issues  is
due to  the fact that such review involves  decisions of inherently  po-
litical, rather than legal issues:
There  is  no nonarbitrary  way  to arrive  at the  proper  legal
rules, no way  to get  to sensible  bottom lines  by something
that  looks  and  feels  like  legal  analysis.  Wh'lether  propor-
Wheat) 316, 421  (1819),  which should serve  as  a guide  to Congress's  general  powers).  For
other critiques of Fors'proportionality standard, see Douglas Laycock.  Coneeplual  Gulfs  m City
of Boeme v. Flores,  39 WM & MARY L  REV.  743, 770-71  (1998);  Michael  W.  McConnell.  Cam-
ment: Institutions and Interpretation:  A  Critique of City of Boeme v. Flores,  Ill l-Lv. L  REv.  153.
166-67  (1997)  [hereinafter  McConnell,  Institutions and  nte reration).  For  more  favorable
treatment of F/ora'proportionality analysis,  sce  eg.,  David  P.  Currie, RFRA,  39  W.%I  & .M-h  L
REv. 637, 640  (1998)  ("In demanding a congruence and  proportionality between the injury  to
be prevented  or remedied and the means adopted  to that  end, the Court in  Fores set forth an
attractive  test that it would no longer blindly accept  untenable congressional  pretenses  that a
particular measure  was 'appropriate'  to enforce  the Civil War amendments  or "necessary and
proper' to protect interstate and foreign commerce")  (internal citation omitted); Marci  Hamil-
ton, City of Boeme v. Flores, A LandmadrforSrturalAnasis,  39 WMt & MLRY L  REV. 699, 712-
14 (1998).
,2  Nor is it surprising that scholars have noted the apparently increased rigor of proportion-
ality review of congressional action as compared with earlier test of mere  "rationality,"  and dis-
agreed whether  this is a good  thing.  Se  eg., McConnell,  Institutions and Inteipraraton. supra
note 71, at 166-67 (describing proportionality and congruence as more stringent than approach
epitomized in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.  641,  653 (1966));  Stephen  Gardbaum.  The Federal-
ism Implications of Flores, 39  WM & MARY L  RE%% 665, 677 n.52  (1998)  ('The Farm majorin ...
presumed...  that Congress enacted  RFRA with the legitimate aim of enforcing the Free Exer-
cise clause as interpreted in Smith and employed the proportionality  test to determine whether
the means - imposing the compelling interest standard on the states - were properly related  to
it.");  Hamilton,  supra note  71,  at 712-14  (approving  proportionality  test as one  designed  to
make Congress perform its duties reasonably well); Laycock. supra note 71, at 770-71 (criticizing
proportionality test for allowing judicial "second-guessing of [questions  ofl degree in the inter-
pretation of its delegated powers").
SeeHarmelin v. Michigan, 501  U.S.  957 (1991)  ("We conclude  [that] the Eighth  Amnend-
ment contains no proportionality guarantee.").
W4  See William Stmtz, Criminal  Procedure  and CriminalJustize, 107  'I'.  Lj.  1.  72-73  (1997)
("The  prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments could plausibly be read to imply a propor-
tionality principle for sentencing....").
See,  e.g.,  BECCARIA,  OF  CRIMES AND  PUNISHMENTS  SECTION 23 (1764),  translated  in  Jane
Grugson  (1996)  (asserting that punishments should be graded to correspond with the gravit',  of
the crime); see also H.L.A.  Hart, Prolegomenon to te Pinciples of Punishwit,  in PuNISII.%E"I"r  -VMD
RESPONSmILiTY:  ESSAYS IN  THE PHILOSOPHY OF  LMW  1, 14-15  (1968)  (arguing  a utiliLarian  view
that punishment should be distributed, in part,  in proportion  to the seeriti  of the offense.
Early U.S.  state constitutions included  provisions requiring that penalties  be  'proportioned  to
the nature of the offense."  See,  e.g.,  N.H.  CONST.  of 1783 (cited  in ANDREV' VON  I-lSsit:.  DOI\ t
JUSTICE:  THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 67 (1976)).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tionality  review  [of criminal  sentences]  is lodged  in  appel-
late or trial courts, the only way to do it is to do it, to decide
that this sentence is too great but not that one.  There is no
metric  for  determining  right  answers,  no  set  of  analytical
tools  that  defines what  a  given  sentence  ought to  be ....
Similarly,  [with  respect  to  the  definition  of  substantive
crimes]  heightened  mens  rea requirements  for overbroad
crimes  beg  the  question  of which  crimes  are  overbroad.
Special culpability rules for, say, mail fraud would inevitably
rest on a judicial judgment that mail fraud is badly defined,
that Congress criminalized more than it should have.7
Thus,  Professor  Stuntz  suggests,  review  for  proportionality  would
"amount[]  not just to  open-ended judicial regulation...  but also  to
arbitrary  judicial  regulation,  regulation  that  produces  outcomes  un-
tethered to any definable legal principle.,
77
What is striking here is the degree to which,  in the United States,
proportionality itself is not seen as a "definable legal principle." 78  Yet,
in Canada, whose  court  decisions  are  readily  available  in  English, 79
proportionality  is  a  basic  tool  for analyzing  the  constitutionality  of
measures  claimed  to violate individual rights.
8
1 Likewise, proportion-
ality is a widespread concept in European law.  The idea of propor-
tionality is  one  that inheres  in many conceptions  of  justice  and just
82 lawmaking,  and  is  embodied  in  some  of the  articulated  "means-
7  See Stuntz, supra note 74,  at  73.
Id.; see also Noonan,  supra note 71,  at 470-71  ("Proportion  is not a criterion.  It is hard to
see how proportion would work as  a criterion for civil  legislation.  It is difficult to see how pro-
portion worked in Boerne.").  But cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490  (1976)  (arguing that dis-
parity between  Fourth Amendment errors of police and windfall  to guilty defendant of exclud-
ing  evidence  "is  contrary  to  the  idea of proportionality  that  is  essential  to  the  concept  of
justice").  Note  that  FAores is  not the first use  of "proportionality"  as a  measure  of legislative
power in the  1990s.  See, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512  U.S. 374, 391  (1994)  (holding that stan-
dard of "rough proportionality" between  the costs of the activity for which  a permit is sought,
and  the benefits  conferred by the  permit should be used to  determine  whether  a regulatory
condition constitutes a governmental  "taking" requiringjust compensation).
78  For a very different evaluation of proportionality principles in the public law of Germany,
France and the European Union, see  NICHOLAS ENiiuou, THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROPORTIONALITY
IN EUROPEAN  LAW: A COMPAATvE STUDY  1 (1996)  ("Proportionality embodies a basic concept
of fairness which  has strengthened the protection of individual  rights at both the national and
supranational  level."  ); see also DAVID BEAY, CONsTrrUTIONAL  LAW IN  THEORY AND  PRACTICE
(1995)  (arguing that all constitutional  principles, transnationally,  can be understood  as  elabo-
ration of the core principles of rationality and proportionality).
9  Canadian cases can be accessed through LEXIS under the library name "Canada."
80  See infra text accompanying  notes 88-105.
81  See EMILIOU,  supra  note 78, at 134 (stating that between 1955 and late 1994, "proportional-
ity" had been argued by litigants or invoked  by the European  Court ofJustice in over 500  hun-
dred cases).
8  See supra note 75.  For state  constitutions that continue  to require  that penalties  be pro-
portional to the nature  of the offense, see  IND. CONST.  art.  I, §  16  (Bill  of Rights)  (1998);  ME.
CONsT. art.  1, §  9  (1998);  NEB.  CONST.  art. I,  §  15  (1997);  N.H.  CONST.  pt I,  art.  18  (1997);
OREGON CONsT. art. I, § 16  (1997).
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ends" tests deployed in U.S.  constitutional law.s
Proportionality  tests  offer both  advantages  and  risks that can  be
analyzed, in part, on the basis of comparative  experience, which  has
largely been in the arena of individual  rights.  In Section A  below,  I
briefly describe  Canada's development of the concept of proportion-
ality in its constitutional law and compare a Canadian and a U.S.  case
on "hate speech" to illuminate salient differences between the Cana-
dian "proportionality" test and the more categorical form of constitu-
tional analysis employed here.  Although  there is much that is attrac-
tive about the  Canadian  analyses,  thoughtful  reflection suggests  that
the prospect of a successful "transplant" of the Canadian approach  to
the United States is uncertain at best.
Section B then sets forth in more detail Flores' use of proportional-
ity, and suggests  that proportionality  as  a  tool for resolving federal-
ism-based  challenges  to federal  power should  be understood  some-
what  differently  than  "proportionality"  analysis  where  individual
constitutional rights are  at stake.  In  the federalism  arena,  "propor-
tionality" tests may have  the  more limited role of being a surrogate
for identifying  the validity of congressional  purpose  and  containing
an otherwise uncontainable  federal power to  obliterate state govern-
ments'  abilities  to function  as independent sources of power.  Com-
parative  experience  also  suggest, however, that in the  United States
such federalism-based  forms of review of national  action  should  be
conducted only with a high degree of deference to legislative findings
and power.  Whether  readers  agree  with  this  conclusion  or  not, I
hope also to show that the U.S.  Supreme Court's constitutional  deci-
sions, and analyses of them, would be improved ifjudges, lawyers and
scholars were more widely aware of the tools and techniques of other
constitutional courts.
83  Rigorous versions of proportionality  tests bear some resemblance  to the requirement of
.compelling  state interest" tests in equal protection analysis, se,  e.g., United  States v.  Paradise.
480 U.S.  149 (1987)  (upholding race-conscious remedial order that fifty percent of promotions
go to black officers, on grounds that the remedy was "narrowly tailored" to serve a 'compelling
government purpose" in light of the ineffectiveness of alternatives. flexibility and limited dura-
tion of the relief, and its limited adverse impact on third parties), and the standard for uphold-
ing discriminatory state regulation of commerce, see Maine v. Taylor, 477  U.S.  131  (1986)  (up-
holding  facially  discriminatory  ban  on  imported  live  baitfish  because  danger  to  native  fish
populations  was genuine  and there was no less discriminatory  alternative for screening  poten-
tially diseased baitfish).  See also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460  U.S. 780, 789 (1983)  (invalidating
as  unduly burdensome  on First Amendment  rights a state law  requiring  independent  candi-
dates to file for November ballot in March  and stating that court must detehnine  leitimacy
and strength" of state's assertedjustifications and "must also consider the extent to which  those
[state]  interests  make  it necessary  to burden"  plaintiffs'  rights).  The  'narrow  tailoring'  re-
quirement  is at times articulated  as part of the Canadian  proportionality  test.  embodying  the
idea that when a fundamentally important right is at issue,  intrusions  on the exercise of that
right must be proportioned  both to the end being served and the harm being caused.  &e, e.g.,
Thomson Newspapers v. Canada, 1998 DLR Lexs 399  (Supreme Court May  19.  1998)  (finding
unconstitutional  a law requiring a news blackout of reporting on any opinion polls within three
days of election as not narrowly tailored  to achieve  purpose of preventing reporting of neu, polls
without time for reflection and response).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.  Canada's  Constitution and the Oakes  Test:
Proportionality  as a Principle  In Protecting  Individual  Rights
Canada adopted a rights-protecting  constitution in  1982, The Ca-
nadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 4  The Charter begins with a
section that is both  declaratory and limiting of the  enforceability  of
its  subsequent  provisions:  "The  Canadian  Charter  of  Rights  and
Freedoms  guarantees  the  rights  and freedoms  set out  in it  subject
only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstra-
bly justified  in a free  and  democratic  society." 85  The Canadian  Su-
preme Court has construed  this provision to mean that even ifa law is
found to violate some particular right set forth in the Charter, the law
can  nonetheless  be  upheld  if it is  "demonstrably justified  in  a  free
and democratic society. 8  Thus Charter claims typically  are analyzed
with  a  generous  interpretation  of what  the  rights-protecting  provi-
sions cover; 7 if an infringement of one of those  provisions  is found,
then  the  more  important  analysis  often occurs  under the  rubric  of
this Section  1 standard.
In analyzing this standard, the  Canadian Supreme  Court  ("Cana-
dian Court") has held that two inquiries must be made:  first, whether
the purpose of the governmental intrusion on the freedom or right is
legitimate and of sufficient importance  to justifying limiting a right;s
second, whether the means chosen are proportional to the purpose -
(i)  are  they rationally connected  to  the objective,  (ii)  do they impair
the  protected rights  as little  as possible, 8 9 and  (iii)  are the  effects  of
84  See  CAN.  CONST.  (Constitution Act,  1982)  pt. I  (Canadian  Charter  of Rights  and Free-
doms).
Id. at§ 1.
SeeR. v. Oakes [1986]  1 S.C.R. 103, 114.
87  See,  e.g.,  Prostitution  Reference  Case  [1990]  1 S.C.R.  1123  (holding that solicitation  of
prostitution is a form of freedom of expression  under Charter Section  2 (b) infringed  upon by a
criminal prohibition of soliciting, yet upholding the prohibition as reasonable and justified un-
der Section  1);  R. v. Skinner  [1990]  1 S.C.R.  1235  (same).  For  a critique  of this kind of ap-
proach,  see  Peter  W.  Hogg,  Interpreting the Charter of Rights:  Generosity and Justification, 28
OSGOODE  HALL L.J. 817  (1990)  (arguing that a broad  interpretation  of rights cannot coexist
with stringent standards ofjustification and favoring narrow rights interpretation)  [hereinafter
Hogg, Interpreting  the Charter  of Rights].
AsJustice Dickson explained in Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at  138,  this "standard must be high in or-
der to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the principles integral  to a free
and democratic society do not gain section 1 protection.  It is necessary, at a minimum, that an
objective  relate  to concerns  which are  pressing and substantial  in a free and  democratic  society
before it can be characterized as sufficiently important." (emphasis added).
89  In  Oakes, the  Court  used language  that seemed  to invite  a "least restrictive  alternative"
standard of great severity.  Critics noted how difficult it can be  to meet that standard, given  the
creativity of courts and lawyers in finding such alternatives.  Within the year, however, the ap-
parent rigidity of the  initial articulation was modulated  in an opinion joined  by the author  of
Oakes. SeeR. v. Edward Books and Art, Ltd. [1986]  2 S.C.R. 713, 772 (characterizing  the inquiry
as whether it impairs freedoms as little as reasonably possible); Pamela A. Chapman,  The Politics
ofJudging. Section  I of the Charter of Rights  and Freedoms,  24  OSGOODE  HLXLL  L. J.  867, 886,
889-90  (1987)  (describing Edwards  Books as a substantial softening of the Oakes standard).
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the measure generally proportional  to  the objective.,  These are  the
inquiries of the so-called  Oakes test.
This test of proportionality  is used in a wide range  of  Canadian
constitutional  adjudications  that  take  place  under  a  constitutional
delegation  to the  courts essentially  to  strike  a balance  between  the
protection  of Charter-identified  rights  and  freedoms,  on  the  one
hand,  and  the  "demonstrably justified"  claims  of  the  government
consistent with a "free" and "democratic" society, on the other."  Sec-
tion l's provisions were fairly widely understood to invite the Court to
make "moral and political" inquiries and judgments in resolving con-
stitutional questions.92
A significant  number of cases  in  Canada apply  the  Oakes  test  of
proportionality to determine whether to uphold a law even though it
trenches in some way on basic rights and freedoms.  The test does not
seem to be particularly associated with outcomes in favor of or against
the government position, unlike the "compelling interest" test of U.S.
equal protection jurisprudence.  Some famous cases, like  Oakes itself
(dealing with the presumption of innocence),  the Canadian abortion
decision,  and a recent  decision  concerning  a national  ban  on  to-
bacco  advertising,9  have struck  down  laws  that the  government  ar-
gued were sustainable under the  proportionality test.  In other areas,
the  Canadian  Court  has  sustained  challenged  statutes  under  the
Oakes test, including the hate speech statute challenged  in Keegstra,  a
mandatory retirement  age,9  a ban  on  advertising  directed  at  chil-
dren, 97 and a "secular" one-day-a-week dosing law."
The  Oakes test has been both praised  and deplored  by Canadian
constitutional  scholars.9  Most  scholars  agree  that  the  test  has  not
9D See Oakes [1986]  1 S.C.R. at 139. The test %as foreshadowed  in a brief paragraph  injustice
Dickson's opinion in R  v. Big AL  Drug Mart [1985]  1 S.C.R.  295, but  as  fully articulated  in
Oakes. Justice Dickson also noted that applying the proportionality test '%ill  v'y depending on
the circumstances,"  and that "in each  case courts  will  be  required  to balance  the  interests of
society with those of individuals and groups." Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138-39.
9' See Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 138-39.
See William E. Conklin, Intrpa  ng and Applying the Limitations Clause:  An  Ana4ys  of Section
1, 1982,4 Sup. CT. L. REV. 75,75,87 (1982).
93 SeeR.  v. Morgentaler  [1988]  1 S.C.R. 30.
See RJR MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada  [1995]  3 S.C.R. 199.
95 SeeR.  v. Keegstra  [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697.  See also R.  v.  Butler  [1992]  1 S.C.R. 452.  482, 494,
509 (sustaining pornography ban on publication whose "dominant characteristic..,  is the un-
due exploitation of  sex").
See McKinney v. University of Guelph  [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 (finding that mandatory retire-
ment ages were discriminatory under Section 15 butjustified under Section  1).
See Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec  [1989]  1 S.C.R. 927 (upholding, under Section  1. a ban  on
advertising directed at children under 13, despite its infringement upon Section 2 rights).
98 SeeR. v. Edwards Books and Art [1986]  2 S.C.R. 573, 713  (upholding Swtday-closing  law
under Section 1, despite fact that it limited freedom of religion).
Compare  STUART,  supra  note 59, at 18  (criticizing Court's  inconsistency): Cameron,  supra
note 59, at 5 (criticizing Court's subjectivity); and Christopher M.  Dassios & Clifton P. Prophet.
Charter  Section 1: The Decline of Grand Unijfid Th  ory  and the Trend Tow'ards Deference in the Supreme
Court of Canada,  15 ADvocs'  Q. 289, 306  (1993)  (arguing tlat review of proportionality of ef-JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
been deployed with the stringency suggested by its earliest emergence
in  Oakes.l 00  Notably, the  "minimal impairment" test has not been ap-
plied  as  a  "least restrictive  means"  standard, but rather,  as  a more
flexible  analysis  of whether  the  degree  of impairment  of protected
rights is justifiable,  considering the  importance  of the  right, the de-
gree of intrusion, and the  nature  of the  asserted  government inter-
est.01  Yet, Canadian scholars are divided on whether to view  this de-
velopment  as  the  court's  "fundamentally  sound...  moderation, ''0 °
"prudential revisionism,  "'  or "stunning  inconsistency"'O ' - in short,
whether it is a good or a bad thing. 05
Under  Oakes' proportionality test, inquiry begins with  the Court's
deciding what  the purpose  of challenged  legislation  is and  whether
that purpose  is legitimate and sufficiently important.'06  This is not a
non-legal decision; indeed, it is similar to ones that U.S. constitutional
cases frequently address.!  Some of the greatest arenas of controversy
fects  and objectives  "pushes at the  margins of the judiciary's  institutional  role" and  calls  into
question  legitimacy of constitutional  review)  with Martha Jackman, Protecting  Rights and Promot-
ing Democracy:  Judicial  Review  Under Section  1 of the  Charter,  34  OSGOODE  HALL L. J.  661,  674
(1996)  (praising majority and  dissenting  opinions in  RJR-MacDonald commercial  speech  case
for addressing democratic  legitimacy of rights-infringing legislation);  Monahan, supra note 58,
at 107,  114  (praising moderation of court and its deference  to legislative  decisions); Andrew
Lokan, The Rise and  Fall  of Doctrine Under Section I  of the Charter,  24 OTrAWA L.  REv.  163,  190-92
(1992)  (praising the  Canadian  Court's  abandonment  of formal  doctrine  in favor  of a more
categorical  U.S.-style approach producing  a more coherent approach  that exposes  the role  of
normative judgments  in judicial decision  making)  and Blache,  supra note  59, at 450  (praising
court for move toward more open balancing).
10 See, e.g.,  STUART, supra note 59, at 18; Monahan, supra  note 58, at  107-114. 01  See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra  [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697  discussed infra text accompanying  notes  118-
151.
102  Monahan, supra  note 58, at 107,  118.
103 Blache, supra note 59, at 438.
104  STUART, supra  note 59, at 18.
105  Some  argue  that the third  criteria (proportionality of effects) itself never matters under
the Oakes test, because  prior criteria  (sufficiently important purpose,  rational  connection  and
minimal  impairments)  preclude  it  from  having  independent  force.  See,  e.g.,  HOGG,
CONsTITuIoNAL  LAW OF CANADA,  supra  note 46, at 882-83;  Lokan, supra note  99, at 172.  The
Canadian  cases suggest,  however, that the overarching  concept of proportionality  between  the
means  used  to achieve  a legislative  purpose, and  both their  positive  effects in  achieving  that
purpose  and their negative  effects on protected  rights, has  become  an important  part of the
overall application of the Oakes test.  This is well-illustrated in Dickson's opinion in Keegstra, dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 127-151.
106 See Oakes, at 138  (objective must be "pressing and substantial in  a free and democratic so-
cieg").
Compare, for instance,  General  Motors  Corp. v.  Tracy, 519  U.S.  278, 312  (1997)  (holding
that a state has a legitimate interest in safety served by differential  scheme for taxing natural gas
products) with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)  (noting that the "desire to harm a politically
unpopular group" cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest).  This is not to say that
the Court finds these judgments  easy, or always agrees on the methodology for identifying the
purpose  of a challenged  law.  See,  e.g.,  Washington  v. Davis,  426  U.S. 229,  240-41  (1976)  (in
holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not condemn neutrally-motivated action  that has
a disproportionate  impact on racial  minorities, Court notes that such disproportionate impact
may be  evidence of invidious purpose).  Compare Justice Powell's opinion in  Kassel v.  Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662,  670-74  (1981),  concluding  that a purported safety regula-
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concern the definition and evaluation of legislative  objectives.''  U.S.
constitutional  law requires,  in  some  areas,  definition  of a  statute's
purpose, its  legitimacy, and importance.'9  In  this  respect, both  the
U.S.  and  Canadian  constitutional  systems  already  address  similar
questions.
Moreover, both  the  U.S.  and  Canadian  legal  systems  sometimes
require their constitutional  courts to examine the nature of the con-
nection  between  the  government  purpose  and  the  means  chosen;
likewise,  both systems  are open to  the  charge that the definition  of
purpose  can be used to  assure  greater  or lesser fit with  the means
chosen."  While  the  language  of "proportionality"  is  not generally
used in the  United States,  the underlying questions - involving  the
degree  of fit between  the claimed  objective  and the  means  chosen,
and a concern for whether the intrusion  on rights or interests  is ex-
cessive in relation to  the purpose - are already an important part of
some fields  of U.S.  constitutional  law, especially  equal  protection,' and free  speech. 112  The simplicity of the  underlying idea  of propor-
tion was unconstitutionally burdensome  on interstate  commerce,  with Justice  Brennan's con-
curring opinion, rejecting the purported safety justification  as an after the fact  rationalization.
See id.  at 679-87.
108  Compare, for instanceJustice  LaForest's view of the purpose of the law in RJR MacDonald
v. Canada [1995]  3 S.C.R. 199,  272-73 (diminish  tobacco consumption)  ivith  the prevailingjus-
tices'  view  (discourage  new smokers  from starting  to smoke  by "reducing  advertising-related
consumption").  See id.  at 335-36  (McLachlin,J.).  The narrower definition  of  the purpose led to
a finding that a ban on all advertising was disproportional, since  a ban on the type of  advertis-
ing targeted at new smokers would suffice, and advertising directed at existing smokers and en-
couraging them to change brands would not rationally and proportionally relate  to that more
narrowly-defined goal.  See id.
109 See Elena  Kagan,  Private Speedz  Public Purpos  The Role of Goterntal  Motne  m  Fst
Amendment Doctrine, 63  U.  CHi.  L  REv  415,  447-53  (1996)  (characterizing  First Amendment
cases disfavoring content-based regulation  as concerned  ith improper government purpose).
See also United States v. O'Brien, 391  U.S.  367, 376 (1968)  (when speech and nonspcech  ele-
ments combine in single course of conduct, "a sufficiently important governmental  interest in
regulating the nonspeech  element can justify incidental  limitations on First Atendment free-
doms");  Hunt v. Washington  State  Apple Advertising Comm'n,  432  U.S.  333,  352-53  (1977)
(discussing evidence of  state's impermissibly protectionist motive in dormant Commerce Clause
constitutional challenge to apple-labeling law).
110  See generally,  Note, Invidious Legislative  Purpose, Rationali,  and  Equal  Pm!eztaon, 82 Y  UE L  J.
123, 137-38  (1972)  (arguing that "it is always possible for a court to define the evil or the good
at which legislation is aimed so as to make the statutory classification  too broad or too narrow
for achieving the purpose thus defined").
I  See, eg., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,  202 (1976)  (finding that the minor statistical differ-
ence between drunk driving by young men and young women was too "tenuous  [a] fit" to justify
a different drinking  age).  See generaly STONE  Er. AL., supra note  65, at  567-68  (discussing
means/ends nexus in equal protection analysis).  On procedural due process, consider Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-50  (1976),  which offered a balancing test to determine what pro-
cedures are required in administrative  contexts, including  the nature of tie private interest  to
be affected, the risks of error and benefit of added procedures  in reducing error, and the gov.
ernment  interests in proceeding  as it has been. One could  conceive of Mlath-s as involving a
decision that the procedures required by the Constitution are no more than are proportional to
the interests at stake in light of the risks of error.
1  See,  e-g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491  US. 781,  796-802  (1989)  (upholding require-
ment that performers  use city-owned equipment in light of City's interest in noise control andJOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tionality  in U.S.  constitutional  law  may  be  obscured  by  the  several
doctrinal forms of multi-factored tests in which it is embodied.' s
These  basic  similarities  between  U.S.  and  Canadian  approaches
suggest that differences in how analyses are conducted might usefully
be  examined - for what lawyers and judges may be able to "borrow"
or "transplant"14 or for a better understanding of how the systems dif-
fer and of their possible need to differ.  The Canadian proportionality
cases  differ  interestingly  from  some  current U.S.  constitutional  ap-
proaches in several respects.  First, the Canadian Supreme Court pro-
vides more contextualized attention  to the circumstances of the chal-
lenged  enactment. 5   Second,  the  Canadian  Court's  analyses
acknowledge  a broader range  of relevant,  competing  constitutional
values.  Third, the  Canadian justices  explicitly consider comparative 116
sources.  Finally,  Canadian  cases  seem  to  reflect  a greater  connec- tion between  the articulated test and the  decision-making  process of
availability  of other means  of communication;  regulation  of time,  place and  manner of pro-
tected  speech  must  be  narrowly  tailored  but  need  not  be  least  intrusive  means;  protected
speech may not be burdened more  than necessary  to further legitimate government  interest);
Central  Hudson  Gas  and Electric  Corp. v. Public Service  Comm'n,  447  U.S. 557,  565  (1980)
(requiring that restrictions on commercial speech  be no broader than  necessary to accomplish
state's interest);  O'Brien, 391  U.S.  at 377  (upholding ban  on draft card  burning because  gov-
ernment interest in maintaining effective  draft was sufficiently important  to justify incidental
restrictions on First Amendment freedom of expressive conduct).  See also 44 Liquormart Inc. v.
Rhode  Island, 517 U.S. 484, 529-30  (1996)  (O'ConnorJ. concurring)  (arguing that ban on ad-
vertising beer prices failed the "final prong" of Central  Hudson because the ban "is more  exten-
sive  than necessary  to serve  the State's  interest" and  the "fit between  Rhode Island's  method
and  [its]  goal  is not reasonable").  For one  Canadian  writer's suggestion  that  the  Oakes test is
similar to O'Brien, see Lokan, supra  note 99, at 174.
11  See also BEATFY,  supra note 78, at 107 (arguing that all important doctrines of U.S. consti-
tutional  law concerning  individual rights rely on standards of rationality and proportionality to
conduct means-end and equaling analyses).  Unlike  Beatty, I do not claim  that proportionality
is a basic source of all constitutional doctrine, only that, even if the word itself is unfamiliar, the
concept as  it is used in the Canadian  cases  is not.  For a critique of Beatty's universalistic and
approving approach  to judicial enforcement of constitutional  rights, see Richard F. Devlin, Some
Recent  Developments  in  Canadian Constitutional Theory  With  Particular  Reference  to  Beatty  and
Hutchinson, 22 QUEEN'S  L. J.  81  (1996);  see also ALLAN  HUTCHINSON,  WAITING  FOR  CORAF:  A
CRITIQUE  OF LAW AND RIGHTS  66-75  (1995)  (criticizing Beatty's faith  in his own account of the
Charter).
114 See Alan Watson,  Legal Change: Sources of Law and Legal Culture, 131  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1121,
1124  (1983)  (describing  the extent of "legal  transplants" and arguing  that "[b]orrowing  from
another system is the most common form of legal change").
1  The so-called  "contextual approach" is anticipated in R. v.  Oakes [1986]  1 S.C.R. 103,  139
(Dickson,  CJ.)  ("the  nature  of the  proportionality  test will  vary  depending  on  the  circum-
stances")  and was more fully developed by Justice Wilson in her concurrence EdmontonJournal
v. Alberta [AG.]  [1989]  2  S.C.R. 1326, 1353, 1355-56 and byJustice McLachlin  in Rocket v. Royal
College of  Dental Surgeons of Onterio [1990]  2 S.C.R. 232, 246-47.  It was adopted  by the Canadian
Court in R. v. Keegstra [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697, 737, 760-61  (concluding, inter  alia, that the Section  1
analysis of a limit on Section 2(b) protected  freedom of expression  "cannot ignore the nature
of the expressive  activity which the state seeks to restrict" and noting the "importance of context
in evaluating expressive activity under" Section  1).
16  See, e.g., R. v. Keegstra  [1990]  3 S.C.R. 377,  738-44  (Dickson,  CJ.)  (discussing  U.S. First
Amendment  case law);  id. at 811-23  (McLachlin, J.,  dissenting)  (reviewing  U.S.  case  law and
international experience).
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the judges, possibly with a corresponding  increase in  the accessibility
of the decision  to outside observers."
7  These differences are  briefly
elaborated below.
1. Hate Speech Cases: Keegstra and RA  .
As  an  example  of these  differences  between  Canadian  propor-
tionality analysis  and the  more  "categorical" approach  of some  U.S.
cases, consider R.A. V. v. St. Paut8 and  R.  v.  Keegstra.  "9  In R.A.V,  the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance on the grounds
that the  law - which  punished hate speech  amounting  to  "fighting
words" based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender - was an im-
permissible  content-based  and viewpoint-based  regulation because  it
excluded hateful "fighting words" not based on race, color, creed, re-
ligion, or gender.' 20  In Keegstra, a closely divided Canadian Court up-
held the  conviction  of a high  school teacher  who  used  vividly  anti-
Semitic language in his classes, under a  criminal statute prohibiting
the "willful"  promotion  (other than in private  conversation)  of "ha-
tred against any identifiable group ...  distinguished  by colour, race,
religion or ethnic origin.
"
1
In Keegstra, all of thejustices agreed  that, while the prohibition in-
fringed  free  expression  guarantees  of Charter  Section  2(b),'-  the
purpose of the statute was to prevent the promotion  of group hatred
and that this  w.vas  a sufficiently  legitimate and  important interest,  in
theory, to justify the infringement of rights under the first prong of
the  Oakes'  Section  1  test.  Where  the justices  disagreed  was  in
whether the statute was proportional  to this objective.  The majority
found that the statute was rational, and that, in light of the peripheral
nature of the free expression  interests  implicated  by hate speech,  it
minimally impaired  those interests.
24   In contrast, the  dissent ques-
tioned the rationality of using criminal  prosecutions  to prevent hate
speech, arguing that such  prosecutions  may  increase  the appeal  of
the purveyors of prejudice by "martyring" them.'2  Moreover, the dis-
117 For further discussion see infra text accompan)ing notes 144-145,  173-175.
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
1  [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697.
L  SeetRA.V.,  505 U.S. at 391.
121 Keegstra [1990]  3 S.C.R. at 715-16,795  (Dickson, C.J.).
122 See id  at 725-34 (Dickson, C.J.); id.  at 826-42  (McLachlin,J.. dissenting).
1  See id  at  744-58  (Dickson,  CJ.)  (characterizing  statute's  objective  as  preventing  harm
caused by hate propaganda and as pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society); 1d.
at 846-48  (McLachlin,J., dissenting)  (agreeing that the law's objective  is to prevent promotion
of hatred toward identifiable groups, thereby advancing  social harmon) and individual  dignity.
and that these objectives are "dearly... substantial" and, given world history of racial and relig-
ious conflict, "pressing").
1  See id.  at 759-86  (Dickson, CJ.)  (applying the three-part  proportionality analysis of OeAs
to the challenged statute).
M See idL  at 852-53  (McLachlin, J.,  dissenting)  (asserting that the statute  waus  not rationallyJOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
senters argued, the statute did not minimally impair free expression,
in  light of the  breadth  of the  statute  and  the  track  record  of en-
forcement threats under it.' 26
Both the majority and the dissent in Keegstra, as in other Canadian
cases  applying  the  Oakes proportionality  test,  demonstrate  the  influ-
ence  of a context-specific  approach.  For  example,  the majority  de-
scribes  the  work  of an  extrajudicial  commission  established  in  the
1960's to  investigate  hate crime  in Canada in order to  establish  the
importance of the government's interest and the nature of the harms 127
caused  by hate speech.  Both the majority and the dissent reviewed
factual material to conclude  that the problem of hate speech in Can-
ada was substantial, although not of emergency dimensions.  2'  In ex-
plaining  its disagreement  with  the  majority  on proportionality,  the
dissent  did not hesitate  to  elaborate  on  the experience  in pre-Nazi
Germany, which, it argued, suggests that the result of the prosecution
for  hate  crimes  may  be  to  increase,  rather  than  decrease,  such
crimes.' 29  The majority responded by explaining why, as an empirical
matter,  it  did  not  agree  with  the  dissent's  assessment  of  the  evi-
dence.'" °  In R.A.V  v. St. Paul, by contrast, both majority and dissent-
ing opinions rely almost entirely on past  U.S. case  precedents in re-
solving the difficult constitutional questions presented.
3'
Another  interesting feature  of Canadian  cases  is  the  degree  to
which  the justices  explicitly identify competing  constitutional values
and make comparative normative assessments about those values,  and
in so doing consider the relevance  of comparative  materials.  In R. v.
Keegstra, another area of disagreement concerned  the relative weight
of the  constitutional values  that, all of the Justices  agreed, were  im-
portant under the Canadian  constitution.  For the majority, the con-
stitutional  value of promoting Charter commitments  to  equality and
to a multicultural society by giving equal respect to different  linguis-
tic, racial and religious groups provided strong reason  to uphold  the
hate statute.3 2  For the dissent, however, it was doubtful whether  the
constitutional  commitment  to  multiculturalism  could  ever outweigh
the constitutional value  of free expression, given  the role of free  ex-
connected  to the goal  of preventing promotion  of group hate  because  prosecutions provide
publicity to racists and generate sympathy for them).
126 See id. at 859-62  (McLachlin, J., dissenting)  (noting inter alia  that Salman  Rushdie's book
SATANIC VERSES was stopped at the border for violating the standard).
127 See.  v. Keegstra [1990] 3  S.C.R. at 745-46  (Dickson, C.J.).
128 See id. at 744-58  (Dickson,J.); id. at 846-48 (McLachlin,J., dissenting).
129 See id. at 854  (McLachlin, J., dissenting)  (discussing hate propaganda  regulation  in pre-
Hitler Germany).
130 See id. at 768-71  (rejecting the assertion  that barring hate speech  would increase  its occur-
rence).
1S3 See 505 U.S. at 382-390;  id. at 397-408  (white, J., concurring  in the judgment);  id. at 417-
25 (Stevens,J.,  concurring in the judgment).
132 See R. v. Keegstra  [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697, 755-58  (Dickson, C.J.)  (emphasizing  Canada's con-
stitutional commitment in Charter §  15  to equality and in Charter § 27 to multi-culturalism).
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pression in protecting the democratic order.'" 5  In discussing these is-
sues, both the majority and the  dissent seemed  to  acknowledge  the
importance of the values held by their fellowJustices  in opposition to
their  own  expressed  opinion.'  By  contrast, in RA..,  the  majority
opinion  says little about the possible value  of governmental  opposi-
tion to hate speech and what it does say comes late in  its opinion."'
And  in  Keegstra, both  the  majority  and  the  dissent  discuss  interna-
tional and comparative materials,  while the opinions in R.A.V.  men-
tion neither.
5 7
Finally, the Canadian Section 1 opinions seem to lend themselves
to a candid discussion of constitutional  conflict.  In the Keegstra opin-
ions  discussed  above,  one  has  the sense  that the  Canadian Justices
identified the baseline constitutional values and empirical judgments
that divide them, providing differing assessments  of the weight to be
'"  See i&L  at 833-37, 849-50,  865 (McLachlin, J., dissenting)  (rejecting claims that Charter §§
15 and 27 should limit protection afforded to free speech under § 2).
1  For  example, Justice  McLachlin's  dissent  includes  a  lengthy  discussion  of the  harms
caused by hate speech.  See Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. at 847-48  (stating, inter alia, thmt the  'continued
existence of hateful communication  [undermines] a tolerant and welcoming society, [creating
harm]  both to the individuals and groups who are the targets of prejudice, and to society as a
whole" including loss of talent of all its people).
ISs  The Court's strongest statement is in the  last paragraph  of the opinion  before  the "re-
versed, and...  remanded" sentence.  Se  RA.V. v.  City of St. Paul, 505  U.S. 377,  396  (1992)
("Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's  front yard is rep-
rehensible.");  see also id at 392  (agreeing with  the Minnesota state court that it  is the responsi-
bility of communities to confront messages of hate); id. at 395 (agreeing that interests in ensur-
ing basic  human rights are compelling, but suggesting adequate  content neutral  alternatives
casts doubt on whether the asserted justification  is in fact the statute's purpose).  The disagree-
ingjustices devoted more attention to the values that might support such an ordinance.  Set id.
at 402  (White J., concurring in judgment)  (characterizing  cross burning as an expression  of
violence, intimidation and racial  hatred); i&L  at 407 (arguing that the contested  ordinance re-
flects city'sjudgment that harms based on race, color, creed, religion or gender are more press-
ing public concerns than harms caused by other fighting words, which,  in light of the Nation's
long and painful experience  with discrimination, is plainl)' reasonable).
See Keegstra [1990]  3 S.C.R.  697, 738-44  (Dickson,  C.J.)  (addressing  "the relationship be-
tween  Canadian and American  approaches  to  the  constitutional  protection  of free  speech,"
summarizing U.S. cases, noting importance of being "explicit as to the reasons why or why not
American experience maybe useful in the §  1 anal)sis," and concluding, inter  alia, that the First
Amendment's "strong aversion  to content-based regulation  of expression"  is incompatible %vith
laws prohibiting hate speech but that "even in the United States" expression, e.g.  child pornog-
raphy, can be regulated  based on its content, and that the "special role given equality and mul-
ticulturalism in  the Canadian  Constitution  necessitate  a departure  from the view..,  that the
suppression of hate propaganda is incompatible with guarantees of free expression");  id. at 811-
23  (McLachlin,J. dissenting)  (arguing that problem of hate literature and  free expression  "is
not peculiarly Canadian; it is universal;" futher arguing that U.S.  experience  is most relevant to
Canada's since both constitutions place high value on speech; revieming U.S.  cases and empha-
sizing concerns to avoid  chilling effects on  legitimate speech, and noting  that U.S.  approach
requires "clear and present danger" before free speech can be overrided, in contrast  to interna-
tional approach which finds the objective of suppressing hatred sufficient  to override free  ex-
pression).
For one very oblique reference  see  R.A.V  v. City of St. Paul 505  U.S.  at 382  (noting that
"our society, like other free but civilized societies has permitted" restrictions on speech  in few.
limited areas).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
given  to  competing values and of the  likely effects  of enforcing  the
particular law.  By contrast, in  R.A.V.,  one wonders whether  the ma-
jority really is worried about the law's failure to make it a crime  to say
"Racists are misbegotten"' u - that is, whether the failure  of the hate
crimes statute  to  meet the  "viewpoint neutrality" standard extended
to "fighting words" is sufficiently plausible  to shed  light on what the
justices were most in disagreement about.
39  In  .A.  V,  identifying the
legitimacy  and importance of the statute's goals, and  then analyzing
whether  the  law was  a  rational way  to  achieve  the  legitimate  goals,
whether the law's  adverse effects  on important  First Amendment  in-
terests were  sufficiently limited,  and whether  the law's  effects were,
on  the  whole,  proportional  to  the  legitimate  government  interests,
might have yielded more convincing opinions in RA.  V  - although, as
Justice McLachlin's powerful Keegstra dissent suggests, not necessarily
a different result.
The Canadian course of decisions may also suggest, however, that
the  effort to doctrinalize  the  idea of "proportionality"4  extends  law
beyond the limits of what it can realistically achieve, and may obscure
the  coherence that could otherwise  emerge from  an inquiry into  le-
gitimacy  of  purpose  and  proportionality  or  reasonableness  of
means.  The test more  recently  applied  is  not the  one implied  in
Oakes  - that the measure must always be the method of achieving  the
objective  that minimally impairs  protected rights1 4 2 - but rather, is a
138  Id. at 391-92  (characterizing the ordinance's  practical operation  as  viewpoint discrimina-
tion because it does not prohibit sign that "all 'anti-Catholic  bigots'  are misbegotten," but does
prohibit a sign that all "papists" are misbegotten).  Cf  id. at 434-35  (Stevens, J.,  concurring in
judgement)  (disagreeing with the Court's analysis of viewpoint discrimination  because response
to sign  that all anti-Catholic  bigots are misbegotten is  one that all  advocates  of tolerance  are,
and both are treated the same by the ordinance).
139  See Morton Horwitz, Foreword, The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality Without Fun-
damentaism, 107  HARV.  L.  REV.  30,  113-15  (1993)  (criticizing RA.V.  for  combining  "content
neutrality" and "obliviousness  to social consequences," and as a "flight into abstraction and anti-
consequentialism,"  which  ignored  reality  and  resulted  in shielding  concrete  terrorist  acts  of
cross-burning);  see alsoAkhil Reed Amar, The Case of The Missing  Amendments: RA.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106  HARV. L. REV.  124, 161  (1992)  (noting absence of the "power and passion" of storytel-
ling in  R.A.V.).  R.A.V.  s suggestion  that the presence of non-content-based  alternatives  - pre-
sumably, a broader prohibition  on fighting words - somehow  casts doubt on whether  the city
really did have  an interest in protecting  the rights of members of groups historically  discrimi-
nated against to live  peacefully where they wish, see R.A.V,  505 U.S. at 395, leaves me mystified
at what nefarious purposes the majority suspects.
140 By "doctrinalize," I mean  to distinguish sharply, as  Oakes does, between  the (i) rationality
of the law,  (ii)  the extent to which the law goes beyond  the most limited intrusion  on affected
rights, and (iii) the proportionality of the law's effects on protected rights.
Some Canadian scholars conclude  that the final  element of the Oakes test has played no
independent role, and that most of the water of the Oakes test is carried by the criteria  of legiti-
mate  and sufficiently  important purpose,  rational  connection  and  minimal  impairment.  See,
e.g.,  HOGG,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  OF CANADA,  supra note 46, at 882-83  (arguing that  the final
step  has "never had any influence  on  the outcome  of any case" ...  because  it is  "redundant"
with requirements of a sufficiently important purpose to warrant limiting rights, and of minimal
impairment).
See R. v. Oakes  [1986]  1 S.C.R. 103,  139  (asserting that speech  restrictions must be mini-
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more fluid, sliding-scale  standard measuring the  nature of the intru-
sion on the protected right against the importance of the objective."
In  Keegstra, Justice  Dickson,  author  of  Oakes, explicitly  disavows  a
strong  "least restrictive  alternative  reading" of this part  of the  test,
explaining:
In assessing the proportionality of a legislative enactment to
a valid  government objective,  [section]  1 should not oper-
ate in every instance  so as  to force  the government  to  rely
upon  only  the  mode  of intervention  least  intrusive  of a
Charter  right or freedom.  It  may  be  that  a  number  of
courses of action are available in the furtherance of a press-
ing and substantial  objective,  each  imposing a varying de-
gree of restriction on a right or freedom.  In such  circum-
stances,  the  government  may  legitimately  employ  a  more
restrictive measure,  either alone or as part  of a larger pro-
gram of action, if that measure  is not redundant, furthering
the objectives in ways an alternative response could not, and
is in all other respects  proportionate  to a valid  [section]  I
aim.14
In summarizing  his conclusion  on "minimal impairment" and in
addressing  the  third  "proportionality"  criteria,  Dickson  explicitly
links  the finding of "proportionality"  to  the  importance  under  the
Charter of the interest in combating racial hatred, as well as  the low
(albeit still protected  by Section  2)  value  of the  expression  being
prohibited.'  Likewise,  the  dissent in  Keegstra,  while  reaching a dif-
ferent conclusion on minimal  impairment,  did not insist on a strict
malJ intrusive to survive  constitutional muster); Lokan, supra note 99, at 172.
See Dassios & Prophet, supra note 99,  at 302-03  (construing Irwin Toy Ltd.  %,.  Quebec, and
other post-Oakes cases to use a more deferential test than "least restrictive alternative" focusing
on the basis for the government's  choice); Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec  [1989)  1 S.C.R. 927. 999
("This Court will not, in the name of minimal  impairment, take a restrictive approach  to social
science evidence and  require legislatures  to choose  the least ambitious  means to protect vul-
nerable groups.");  Chapman,  supra note 89,  at 889-90  (noting Canadian  Court's retreat from
Oake' least restrictive means test in Edwards  Books and  Ail).
1  R  v. Keegstra [1990]  3 S.C.R. 697,784-85.
1  See id. at 782, 785,  787 (stressing the value of combating racial hatred over the low value,
"only tenuously connected  ith the values underl)ing the guarantee of freedom of speech." of
the hate speech being banned).  This aspect of  Justice Dickson's  opinion in Kirtnra  has been
criticized  by some who argue that once expression  is found  to be  protected  by  Section  2 of
Charter, its value should not be considered in analyzing  the proportionality of the means used
to prohibit it.  One benefit of the transparency of Dickson's opinion, houver, is that it directly
addresses the closeness of the relationship of hate speech to free expression values, arguing that
it does not lie at the core of what free expression  protects.  In  treating this issue at length  in
connection  with proportionality, I take Judge Dickson to be suggesting that less  is required  to
justify intrusions on protected expression that is less close to core expressive values - an elabo-
ration of the principle of proportionality that corresponds  to the normative constitutional  val-
ues  that seem to  be  motivating his  analysis, and  that, in  its  transparency,  permits clear  dis-
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"least restrictive alternative" reading of the proportionality test.
4 6
One  Canadian judge has argued that the biting edge of the  Oakes
test has, over time,  turned on  the Court's assessment  of how signifi-
candy  the  challenged  law impacts the  rights  protected  by  the  Char-
ter,4  with minor intrusions more likely to be upheld than more sub-
stantial  ones.  The  test  also  seems  to  turn  on  assessment  of  the
relative value of the aspect of the right being infringed.  One  could,
148 for example, read  Keegstra and RJR MacDonald  to suggest  that ad-
vertising about  lawful,  although  injurious, products  is  more  impor-
tant  to  protect  than  hate  speech.  Thus,  the  Oakes proportionality
standard,  with  its  frankly  normative 9  and  contextualized  ap-
proaches 5 0  may have  endured in part because of its flexibility in  ac-
commodating both more, and less, deferential approaches to judicial
review.'
5 1
2.  Transplanting Proportionality?
Returning to the  question of what, if anything, the United  States
could learn, or borrow, from Canada,  on the  one  hand the  "rough
146 See id. at 854-62  (McLachlin,J., dissenting).  Interestingly, McLachlin suggests that use of a
criminal sanction  (rather than  a civil  remedy)  may itself be a constitutionally-disproportionate
response  to intentionally hateful speech, given competing values of freedom of expression,  and
alternative  means of discouraging  hate speech.  Recent  controversies  in the United States con-
cerning  prosecutorial  discretion  raise  questions  whether  U.S.  free  speech  law  might  benefit
from distinguishing  between  conduct that can be made  the basis  of a criminal  prosecution  or
investigation,  on the one hand, and civil remedies on the other.
147 See Roger P.  Kerans,  The Future of Section One of the  Charter,  23  U.B.C.  L.  REV.  567,  576
(1989).
148 RJR MacDonald v. Canada [1995]  3 S.C.R. 199.
149 See  RJR MacDonald,  at 268-78  (LaForest, J., dissenting)  (stating that Section  1 inquiry is
frankly normative, requiring courts to take into account both the nature of the infringed  right
and the specific values and principles on which the state seeks tojustify the infringement).
0 For example, in RJR MacDonald a substantial factor in the majority's decision  to find that
the ban on  tobacco advertising could not be sustained  under Section  1 was a weakness  in  the
presentation  of a form of legislative  history.  The  government refused  to reveal  a confidential
report on which  it purportedly relied  in deciding that the total  ban on advertising of a lawful
product was warranted.  See id. at  345  (McLachlin, J.).  See generally, Kerans, supra note  147,  at
573 (noting the importance of legislative history, and the degree to which  the legislative history
plausibly supports the government's claim of legitimate purpose). 151 In  RJR MacDonald,  the  Canadian Court  held unconstitutional  a federal  ban on  tobacco
advertising.  See [1995]  3 S.C.R. 199.  This  case illustrates the degree to which the definition of
the purpose  of a law can determine whether  the law will be found  to meet the "minimal  im-
pairment" test.  See id. at 335-49  (McLachlin,J.).  For the majority,  the purpose of the law was
only to prevent  new smokers  from starting; with so  narrowly defined a purpose,  the complete
ban (which  included "brand switching" advertising purportedly designed to appeal only to  ex-
isting smokers  to change  their brands)  could not be  seen  as  "minimally impairing"  speech
rights.  See supra  note  108.  The mutability of the precise  definition  of purpose to accord with
the doctrinal "minimal impairment" requirement suggests, in a sense, why the concept of pro-
portionality as more broadly understood may lead to more candid formulations.  Cf Note, supra
note 110, at 154 (urging outright weighing of competing  public policies without "diversionary
discussion" of rationality of means-end nexus).
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justice"  of the  idea of proportionality  has  much  to  commend  iL'2
Troportionality" to "sufficiently important" purposes is no less defin-
able a legal principle than some of the more elaborated  tests of U.S.
law on, for example, free  speech
1 5
3  (although I  do not suggest  it is
equivalent  to  some  of  the  more  stringent  categorical  rules  in  the
United  States, such  as  the  rule  against  prior  restraints  of speech).
Moreover, as developed in the Canadian  case law, the proportionality
test does appear to have certain advantages in its transparency of rea-
soning
T 5 and in its openness to the actual context of decision.  These
qualities offer hope that, under a proportionality  regime,  the Cana-
dian court will distinguish between  the "camel's nose"  in  the tent -
the dreaded slippery slope of the U.S. law school classroom leading to
judicial second-guessing  of legislative  policy judgments'  - and a be-
nign cat's paw, providing a useful tool for making hard judgments in
distinguishing those restrictions that are "demonstrably justified in  a
free and democratic society" and those that threaten the continuance
of that "free and democratic society."'m
152  Canadian scholar Peter Hogg has argued  that, rather than  having a generous interpreta-
tion of rights and a relaxed standard ofjustification  under section 1,  it would be better to read
the scope of the protected rights in the Charter quite narrowly and then  to have a very rigorous
standard  of review under section 1, entailing a very strong presumption against  the validity of
infringements.  See HOG,,  CONSTrtUTIONAL  LAW OF CANADA,  supra  note  46, at 859-60;  Hogg,
Intereting  the Charter  of Rig^ts, supra  note  87, passim. Given the expansive rights orientation of
the movement behind the Charter, however, this alternative  approach  might not fairly capture
the values of both rights-development and of inclusion and pluralism, so evident in the Charter
and in Canada's evolving self-conception.
15  See,  e-g.,  United States v. Grace,  461 U.S.  171  (1983)  (striking dowm  law  prohibiting dis-
plays of banners on public sideualks around the Supreme Court building. because government
may enforce reasonable time, place and manner restrictions in public forums only if the restric-
tions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government  interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication; particular types of expression may be
prohibited only if the prohibition  is narrowly drawm  to accomplish a compelling governmental
interest); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988)  (upholding ordinance that prohibited  resi-
dential picketing on a public street that targeted a particular residence because  'privacy  of the
home is certainly  of the highest order in a free and civilized  society" and thus traranted  the
complete prohibition of targeted residential picketing).
SeeJeremy Kirk, Constitutional  Guarantees,  Charaeaisation  and Proptionality,  21 MELD.  U.  L.
REv. 1, 55-56, 64 (1997)  (commenting that "proportionality" tests require more candor in iden-
tifying competing values and interests).
See Kerans, supra note 147, at 577.  In emphasizing  the importance of a  laws impact ir
evaluating its constitutionality, Judge Roger Kerans distinguishes the Canadian  approach  from
what he describes as the American tendency to "worry a lot about the camel's  noise."  ld.  Can-
ada, being more practical, can distinguish "between innocuous publication bans today and ma-
jor censorship tomorrow."  Id.
'm See Can. Charter (1982),  § 1.  Interestingly,  in RJR MacDonald t  Canada [1995]  3 S.C.R.
199 and 44 Liquonnart v. Rhode Island, 517  U.S.  484 (1996),  the Canadian  and  US. Supreme
Courts reached fairly similar results in striking dowa the constitutionality of complete bans on
advertising for legal products.  In Canada, the ban applied to tobacco advertising- in Rhode  Is-
land, the ban applied to advertising of liquor prices.  In both cases, the respective governments
sought to justify their laws on grounds the courts either accepted  without comment or found
"legitimate" - in Canada, to reduce  tobacco-associated  health  risks by reducing consumption
motivated  by advertising,  see RJR MacDonald [1995]  3  S.C.R.  at 336  (McLachlin. J.);  in  the
United States, to increase beer prices to promote temperance,  see 44 Liquonr.art,  517 U.S. at 504-JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
On the other hand, there are a number of reasons for caution  in
embracing use  by U.S.  courts  of the  Canadian  proportionality  test.
First,  the  contextual,  accessible  form  of reasoning  in  the  Canadian
opinions enhances  the risk that the decisions will be viewed as less the
product of "law" than of particularized judgments.  It is plausible  that
the framers of the Charter intended  the courts  to engage in norma-
tive balancing of constitutional values.17  Thus, in Canada perhaps  a
greater  concern than countermajoritarianism  (that is,  the legitimacy
of the  Court's displacement  of legislative decisions)  is with  the  pre-
dictability of contextualized judgments and the substantive weighting
of constitutional  values.  The  United  States,  by contrast,  has not  so
recently been through a process of self-conscious  constitution forma-
tion, and participants in its legal system may accordingly be more un-




Moreover, the problem of distinguishing false and true necessities
08.  Yet, in both cases, the courts found that the purported purpose did notjustify the means.
In addition, the question was raised whether withholding accurate information from consumers
is ever valid,  either as a means or an end.  The proportionality test in RJR MacDonald  may have
been used to simultaneously  approach and evade  the issue whether it is ever legitimate to with-
hold from consumers information about lawful products on paternalistic grounds.  See [1995J  3
S.C.R. at 343-45  (McLachlin, J.)  (observing that the law deprives consumers  of a legal product
of "important means of learning about product availability to suit their preference,  [and  that] it
will be more difficult to justify a complete ban on a form of expression than a partial ban," and
concluding that the ban was more intrusive on free expression  than necessary to accomplish  its
goals).  The majorities of both courts applied stringent evidentiary standards in addressing the
effect of the means on the government purpose, relied on an absence of evidence directly show-
ing that the  ban would  materially  decrease  consumption,  and  discounted  evidence  that the
product manufacturers  or retailers thought  there was  a connection  between  advertising  and
sales. See RJR MacDonald [1995]  3 S.C.R. at 341-42  (McLachlin, J.); 44 Liquormart, 517  U.S. at
501,  505-06.  Neither Court was  willing wholeheartedly  to adopt the idea expressed  by Justice
Thomas in Liquormart  that the suppression of information about a lawful product is per se inva-
lid. See 44 Liquormart,  517 U.S. at 518-528 (Thomas,J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment);  id. at 504-14  (Stevens,J.); RJR MacDonald [1995]  3 S.C.R. at 343-44.  Yet, both results
tend  to support  the view of a Canadian  commentator  that application of free  speech  norms
here suggest a "consumer/consumption"  oriented view  of a "free and  democratic  society," in
which a defining freedom is consumption choices  (rather than or in addition to political  ones).
See David Schneiderman,  A Comment on RJR-MacDonald  v. Canada,  30 U.B.C. L.  REV. 165,  175-
80 (1996).
. See e.g.,  PATRICK  MONAHAN,  THE  CHARTER,  FEDERALISM  AND  THE  SUPREME  COURT  OF
CANADA 30, 53-60, 78-79  (1987)  (arguing that under the Charter courts are required to  balance
interests and exercise judicial "originality" in interpretation).
Although  there are Canadian scholars who condemn  the flexibility of the evolving  Oakes
test of proportionality,  there are others who are more  enthusiastic, for  reasons that arguably
correspond  to Canadian  legal culture  more than  that of the United  States.  In contrast to Pro-
fessor Tribe's  description  of the  universalistic,  individual  rights-based  U.S.  legal  culture,  see
LAURENCE H.  TRIBE,  ABORTION:  THE CLASH  OF ABSOLUTES  73-84  (1992),  compare  the evident
pride of some Canadian  constitutionalists in what they describe  as Canada's claim  to "the mid-
dle ground" in "the  world of ideas."  See  DALE  GIBSON,  THE LAW  OF  THE  CHARTER:  GENERAL
PRINCIPLES iv-v (1996)  (describing Canadian  Supreme Court decisions as evincing approach  to
legal decision-making called  "the Principled Middle");  see also MONAHAN,  supra  note  157, at  12
(arguing that "Canadian politics has always placed particular emphasis on the value of commit-
nity, in contrast to the overriding individualism of the American experiment").
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is an enduring and difficult one: Is U.S.  legal culture  likely to do with
a proportionality test what Canadian legal culture does?  Is the use of
more  formal  rules  and  tests  more  important  in  the  United  States,
given  the size  of the country,  heterogeneity  of population,  and  the
diversity of lower court systems  that are controlled by Supreme Court
decisions?""  Is  U.S.  legal  culture  likely  to  view  a less  formal,  more
open-ended  approach  examining the  "proportionality" of legislative
means  to legitimate  legislative  goals  as an illegitimate  expression  of
judicial  preferences  as  an  opportunity for invidious  biases  to  affect
decision-making?'1  Or will the courts be able to explain with  enough
consistency what makes  a scheme proportionate,  and why the  meas-
ure of proportionality will vary depending on the importance  of the
right infringed by the law,  the degree  of intrusion  on the protected
right, and the government interests being served?  Do other features
of Canadian  constitutional  law mitigate  the  difficulties  of its  Court
having authority under Section  1 to decide whether or not particular
statutes that infringe on rights are nonetheless  valid under the  Oakes
test?'
6'
A "comparativist" challenge  to  consideration  of "proportionality"
analyses might invoke  earlier  periods  in U.S.  constitutional  history,
when,  for  example,  First Amendment  cases  employed  "balancing"
analyses, to demonstrate the jurisprudential evils of an approach  like
"proportionality" analysis that relies in part on balancing.""'  In Dennis
v.  United States'63 convictions  for violations  of the  conspiracy  provi-
sions of the Smith Act were upheld  based on evidence  that the  de-
fendants "organize[d]  people to teach and themselves  [taught]  Marx-
ist-Leninist doctrine contained chiefly in four books ...  ."'  Both the
plurality opinion and the Frankfurter concurrence  relied  on balanc-
ing tests that sought to measure the gravity of the evil the government
19  On the constraining effects of formal rules, see Frederick  Schauer. Fornnahsrn.  97 YU.E  UJ.
509  (1988).
16  See, eg., TRIBE, supra  note 158, at 74-75.
161 Canada's Charter, for example, also includes the "nomthstanding clause-  of Section 33.
which authorizes both federal and provincial  parliaments  to enact  laws,  for a fite-ear period.
.notwithstanding"  many provisions of the Charter.  One could argue that when  the legislature
chooses not to invoke Section 33, it has  by implication  consented to tie Canadian  courts'  re-
view under the criteria of Section  1.  Cf. MONAHN,  supra note  157. at 81,  115-ti0  (arguing thal
inclusion of the override  provision  was a recognition  by framers  of Charter that courts  might
interpret Charter in unforeseeable ways);  Conklin, supra note 92. at 84 (arguing that in  te ab-
sence of an override,  courts must exercise stringent review of infringements  of rights).  One
might also argue  that, in the United  States, the absence  of an analogous legislati  e  po%%er  to
either short circuit or overcome the results ofjudicial  review makes it more important for judt-
cial review to be conducted under more formalistic and restrained approaches.
162 For a classic argument against balancing as a form of constitutional reasonmg. see gener-
ally, T. Alexander Aleinikoff, ConsitutionalLaw  in theAge of Balancing,  96Y.LE I-J. 943 (1987).
163  341  U.S. 494 (1951).
64 Id.  at  582  (Douglas,  J.,  dissenting)  (identif~ing  the  four  books  as  JoSUEII  SrUI\.
FOUNDATIONS  OF  LENtNISM  (1824);  KARL  NMARX  &  FRIEDRICH  FNGELs,  MvIFESWu  OF  ni.
COMMNIST PARTY  (1848);  V.I. LENIN,  THE STATE  AND  REVOLULTON  (1917);  and  Htsto  ft  OF
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SovIEr U,,IoN (1939)).JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
sought to  contain  by its  passage of the Smith Act against  the accom-
panying intrusion  on free speech'I 5 Many First Amendment scholars
now view the  Court's  decision  in Dennis, and perhaps  especially the
Frankfurter concurrence,  as  wrongly reasoned  and  decided.'6 6  The
approach  of the  Court in Dennis was essentially  abandoned  in  Bran-
denburg  v.  Ohio,1 67 currently the leading case on speech advocating un-
lawful conduct. 6
But it is not at all clear that it was the use of a balancing test used
in Dennis that led to what  is now seen  as an erroneous  decision, un-
derprotective  of free  speech.  Rather,  the  plurality  - applying  the
more definitional "clear and present danger" test, - and Frankfurter
- applying a more  overt balancing  analysis  - gave  greater weight to
the danger of violent overthrow of the government and less weight to
the value  of free expression  of communist  teachings  than would  be
the case under contemporary approaches.  Frankfurter's concurrence
addressed  head on those values and interests that both the majority,
and  the  dissent,  agreed were  relevant. 9  Frankfurter's  key analytical
move  in  conducting  his balancing  was  to  announce  a  principle  of
strong deference  to  the  legislature,7 ° a principle  at odds with  coun-
termajoritarian  purposes  of protecting  freedom  of speech  and  far
more  problematic  than  his  candid  expression  of both  free  speech
values  and his interest  in what was then viewed  as  government  sur-
vival.17'  Dennis might be taken to indicate that the stance of deference
165 See id. at 503  (plurality opinion)  ("societal value of speech must, on occasion,  be subordi-
nated  to other values and considerations");  id. at 509 ("Overthrow  of the Government  by force
and violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the Government  to limit speech");  id.
at 510  (adopting Learned Hand's formulation  of a balancing test measuring discounted  value
and weight of the harm against the invasion on free speech);  id. at 519-25  (Frankfurter, J.,  con-
curring)  (arguing that government's  inherent right to maintain  its existence justifies some re-
strictions  on speech,  and that courts should defer  to legislative  "balance" of the relevant  fac-
tors).
1  See,  e.g.,  Mark Tushnet,  An Essay on Rights,  62  TEX.  L.  REV.  1363,  1372  (1984)  (calling
Frankfurter's Dennis concurrence  "one of the great scandals  of balancing");  Laurent B. Frantz,
The First Amendment  in the Balance, 71  YALE  L.J.  1424  (1962)  (criticizing  Dennis and  arguing
against "balancing" rules in free speech cases).  For a contrary view, see, e.g., Wallace Mendelson,
On the Meaning  of the First  Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance,  50 CAL.  L. REV. 821  (1962).
167  395 U.S. 444 (1969).
168 Brandenburg holds  that "mere  advocacy"  of unlawful  conduct  is protected  by  the  First
Amendment  and  that only if the advocacy  becomes "incitement" of "imminent unlawful  con-
duct" can the speech be punished. Id. at 449.
169 Compare Frankfurter's concurrence in Dennis,  341  U.S. at 519-25  (recognizing individuals'
First Amendment  rights  to think, read, and  teach what  they please,  as well  as  the right of the
government  to preserve  itself)  with Douglas's  Dennis dissent,  id. at 588-89  (stating that "[tjhe
nature  of Communism as a force on the world scene would, of course, be relevant  to the issue
of clear and present danger of petitioners'  advocacy within the United States," but there was no
record evidence of communist power within the United States and the Court could take judicial
notice that as a political party it was  politically impotent).
170 See id at 525-26 (Frankfurter,J.,  concurring).
1  On the purposes of protecting freedom of speech,  even theories that emphasize political
speech  and the  needs of representative  democracies  (as  compared  to broader  theories  more
protective of speech that emphasize human autonomy or identity expression, artistic expression
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that ajudge or court takes towards a problem matters at least as much
as whether the doctrinal test is formulated as one of balancing or one
of definition.'
One might also challenge  the claim that analysis  under a propor-
tionality  or  other  "balancing"  test  will  be  more  transparent  than
analysis relying on more formal categories as rules for decision.  Both
logical  and empirical  reasons  exist,  however, to  think  this might  be
so.  Logically, as Schauer and Tushnet demonstrate, the characteristic
of a formal rule, and of formalism in applying a rule, is to ignore fea-
tures of the case, or context, that might argue for a different result." '
The  salient  characteristic  of  formalist  analysis  is  the  constraining
force of the rule against the felt necessities of particular cases.  And if
the rule of decision does not permit some factors  to be of relevance,
it would not be illogical to ignore or discount those factors; doing so
might avoid or minimize professional  discomfort.  Apart from logic,
I rely on widely held (but not quantitatively verified)  impressions that
"standards" as opposed to "rules," or multi-factored balancing tests as
opposed  to  categorical rules,  are likely  to provide  a larger  range of
arguably relevant  constitutional  factors  than  application  of a  more
formal  rule  (e.g.  "no  content  based"  regulation  or  "no  prior  re-
straint"of  speech) .'
Note,  however,  that  either  formalist  or  "balancing"  reasoning
might produce a formal  ru/&' 7" Compare, for instance,  the opinion of
the U.S. Supreme  Court in RA.V,  which relies  on reasoning  that is
formalist in character  to insist  on a formal  rule that invalidates  the
or the search for truth)  recognize the need  to protect expression  by  those  in the  minorit  as
well as in the majority.  See ALEXANDER  MEIKLEJOHN,  FREE SPEEcH  AND  Irs RELTiO',  To SEL-
GOVERNMENT  15-16, 24-27, 39  (1948)  (arguing that the First Amendment requires that "no sug-
gestion of policy shall be denied a hearing because it is on one side of the issue rather than the
other").  Deference  to legislative majorities  is thus in some respects  p,-micularly inappropriate
in reviewing statutes aimed at minority political  viewpoints.  Se Martin  Ff.  Redish,  AIv,-ae  of
Unlawfud Conduct and the  irst  Amendment: In Defense of Cear  and Present  Dang  70 C.UIF.  L  REV.
1159, 1198 (1982).
1'2  SeeVicki C.Jackson, Printz  and Testa:"  The Infrastrudure  of Federal  Supreran. 32 l\D.  L  RE'.
111,  13840 (1998)  [hereinafterJackson, Pyintz and  Testa].
11  See Schauer, supra note 159, at 510; Mark Tushne,  The Hardest Question in  Constitutional
Law, 81 MiNN.  L. REV. 1, 13-18 (1996).
174 On what some regard as the inevitability of "role discomfort" in being a "good judge," see
Guido  Calabresi,  Foreword: Anti-Discrimination and Constitutional Acrountabdht:  lS71t  tMe  Bath-
Brennan  Debate Ignores, 105 HARV.  L  REV.  80,  132  n.169  (1991)  ("A judge w ho does  not decide
some cases, from time to time, differently from the way he would uish. because  die philosophy
he has adopted requires it, is not ajudge," although ajudge who never stra-s from  ins judicial
philosophy "no matter how important the issue involved, is a fool").
175  See, eg.,  Kathleen Sullivan,  The  Justice  of Ries and Standards, 106 I-LRv. L  REv. 22  (19102);
see also Kent Greenawalt, Free  Speech in  the United States and Canada,  55 LW  & CON'stLP. PROft. 5
(1992)  (discussing and  contrasting "balancing" and  "conceptual"  approaches  to freedom  of
speech).
See Richard H. Fallon,Jr., Foreword.  Impleenting the Constitution, Il  I  -LRR'. L  REV'.  54.  80-
81  (1997)  (distinguishing betveen balancing of multiple factors in formulating a rule  ad bal-
ancing as part of the required test formulated by the Court).JOURNAL OF  CONS  TITUTIONAL LAW
hate speech ordinance at issue,1 77 with Justice McLachlin's concern, in
her  R.  v.  Keegstra dissent,  over the  potential  misuse  of hate  speech
statutes  against  oppressed  groups  themselves,  and  her further  con-
cern  that prosecutions  under hate  speech  statutes  may  be  counter-
productive  towards  equality  and  ant-discrimination  goals  because
they tend to make martyrs of the defendants.'7 8 Arguments in favor of
a categorical  rule, then, can  be formally  analytical, as in RA. V. v. St.
Paul,  or may reflect contextual judgments about a range of factors, as
in the McLachlin  dissent in R.  v. Keegstra.  Even under a "proportion-
ality" analysis, moreover, rules could emerge that would prohibit con-
tent-based  restrictions on an analysis  similar to MacLachlin's.  Trans-
parency values in defining the legal rule can thus be served, at least in
part, by the reasoning that produces a formal rule, although  as lower
courts apply the rule some of this value may be lost.
Finally,  advocates  of more  categorical,  formal  rules  argue  that
such rules will yield greater predictability in results than more  open-
ended judgments  under multi-factored  standards.  Much  of the an-
swer  to  the  question  whether  "proportionality" analyses  will  be  too
unpredictable will  lie in the "doing." Balancing standards bear some
risk of too much fluidity, permitting constitutional values  to yield too
readily  to the  perceived  expediences  and conveniences  of the given
time;  Alex  Aleinikoff  has  rightly  pointed  to  the  risk  of reducing
"rights"  to  simply an  item of cost  and benefit  that  balancing meta-
phors  may  entail. 79 Yet  proportionality  analysis,  in  its  emphasis  on
judgment, may be less  likely to  have  this effect  than "balancing" tests
articulated  in  the  language  of a  scientific  scale.  Categorical  rules,
moreover,  may obscure more than prevent the  exercise  of judgment
about matters  of context  and  degree.'8°  Free  speech  values  under
proportionality  analysis  should be  given  great weight  in  a  free  and
7  The formalism of its reasoning is manifest, for example, in the Court's analytical concern
with a hypothetical example of anti-bigotry "hate" speech being outside the reach of the statute,
in order to demonstrate that the statute is not content or viewpoint neutral, as if the logic of the
"no content based" rule  would be convincingly  self-evident in such a decontextualized  (some
might  say, counterfactual)  setting.
See [1990]  3 S.C.R  697, 701.
1-9 Aleinikoff, supra  note 162, at 987.
190  For  example,  the  rule against prior restraints  on  speech  can  fairly  be  understood  as  a
categorical rule.  However, defining what counts as speech and as a prior restraint, and whether
there are exceptions to the rule (as in where there is a clear and present danger that the speech
sought to be restrained  will lead  to imminent violence),  all involve  questions ofjudgment  and
context.  Compare, e.g.,  Snepp v. United States, 444  U.S.  507,  509 n.3  (1980)  (per curiam) (up-
holding enforcement of former CIA employee's  agreement not to publish  information without
prepublication  clearance  and  rejecting  argument that  the  agreement  was  an  unenforceable
prior restraint on speech)  with New York Times  Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.  713  (1971)  (re-
versing an injunction  against newspaper  publication  of a secret Defense  Department study  of
Vietnam war,  leaked  by a former  Pentagon  official,  because  the government  had not met  its
heavy  burden  of  overcoming  the  presumptive  rule  against  prior  restraints);  id. at  731  n.1
(White, J., concurring)  (noting that National  Labor Relations Board and Federal Trade  Com-
mission  cease-and-desist  orders often  restrain what  employers  or businesses  can  say,  and that
copyright laws also authorize injunctive relief).
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democratic society, and proportionality analysis could yield presump-
tive protection for speech falling into categories  that a court views as
highly protected.'8'  Finally, how important predictability  is as a value
may vary with the constitutional  context, and the hardest cases at any
point in  time  may  be least  likely  to  be  constrained  by  preexisting
"formal" rules  and the  most  difficult  to  predict under  "balancing"
analyses.
Whether  in  the  lower  courts  some  constitutional  values  may  be
better protected through categorical rules rather than multi-factored
analyses, seems open to debate.  (As noted earlier, the size and diver-
sity of lower courts that will be called on to enforce and apply the rule
may be  relevant  to  this  inquiry.')  What  Keegstra illustrates  is  that
constitutional  reasoning in difficult  cases  can  be illuminatingly  car-
ried out under the "proportionality" test and that this approach  has
some advantages over alternative styles of reasoning.
Keegstra raises, but cannot answer  the question whether U.S.  con-
stitutional reasoning and law would be improved by use of such alter-
native approaches, or, more generally, by considering how other con-
stitutional systems have  responded to similar problems.  As discussed
below, awareness of the uses of "proportionality" analyses in the con-
stitutional law of other nations  may help in understanding  the impli-
cations and possibilities of the U.S. Supreme Court's recent embrace
of the idea of proportionality in City ofBoerne v. Flores.'"
B.  City of Boerne v. Flores:  Proportionality  and  Federalism
In Flores, the  Court held unconstitutional  the  Religious Freedom
Restoration Act [RFRA].  RFRA was enacted in direct response to the
Court's  1990  decision  in  Smith  v.  Employment  Division,"  which
changed prior law to hold that neutral generally-applicable  laws may
constitutionally be applied even  to  those who  claim  that the law im-
poses  a  burden  on  a  religious  practice.  Under  Smith,  generally-
applicable  laws,  such  as  those  prohibiting  the  use  of peyote,  pre-
scribing the diet for state prisoners,'6 or requiring autopsies  in cases of sudden death,'  are immune from attack on the grounds  that for
181 SeeLokan, supra note 99, at 163  (predicting development of categorical  rules through ap-
plications of Section  1 proportionality analysis).  Some Canadian scholars  have argued that the
Oakes proportionality test ought to be applied with different levels of scrutiny for different cat-
gories of conduct in the  free expression area;  for example,  political speech  would  be  more
highly  protected than commercial speech.  See Cameron, supra note 59,  at 69-72.
See LawTence Lessig, Translating  Federaism- United States v.  Loprz  1995 Sep.  Cr.  REV  125,
172-73  (1995).
e  521 U.S. 507 (1997).
184 494 U.S. 872  (1990).
165  See i
18  For pre-Smith cases involving such  claims, see, for example.  McElyea v.  Babbitt.  833 F.2d
196 (9th Cir. 1987); Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
18  See, eg., Yang v. Sturner, 750 F. Supp. 558, 559  (D.R.I. 1990)  (upholding constitutionality,JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
some  persons  (typically  members  of minority  religious  groups)  the
practice  proscribed  by  law  is  required  by their  religion  or  that  the
practice required by law is prohibited by their religion.
Under RFRA, by contrast, neutral, generally-applicable  laws could
be challenged as burdening religious practice.  Under RFRA, a state,
local, or federal government may not impose a substantial burden on
a religious practice unless the government can establish that the bur-
den it is imposing is  the least restrictive means of serving a  compel-
ling government interest.
188
F/ores held that this statute exceeded Congress's power under Sec-
tion 5  of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9  The Section  5  power,  the
Court concluded,  was  limited  to  remedying or preventing  violations  of
Section 1 and did not permit Congress to change or to alter the sub-
stanive meaning of the rights secured by Section  1 of the Fourteenth
Amdendment.  While  recognizing  that the  distinction  between  re-
medial  and  substantive  laws  was  a  fine  one,  the  Court  nonetheless
found that RFRA was an impermissible attempt to  alter the meaning
of the Free Exercise  Clause as it had been interpreted by the Court in
Smith.'9'  In light of the Smith decision  concerning what constitutes  a
free exercise violation, the F/ores Court held RFRA to be an impermis-
sible exercise  of the Section  5 power because  RFRA could not be re-
under Smith, of requiring autopsy notwithstanding Hmong religious beliefs).  According to Flo-
res, much of the legislative  discussion preceding  RFRA focused  on concern over autopsies per-
formed  "on Jewish individuals  and Hmong  immigrants  in violation  of their  religious  beliefs."
521 U.S. at 531  (citingReligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearing on H.R. 2797 before
the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional  Rights of the House Committee on thejudiciary,
102d  Cong.,  2d  Sess.  81  (1993)  [hereinafter  "House  Hearings"]  (statement  of  Nadine
Strossen));  id. at 107-10 (statement of William Yang);  id. at 118  (statement of Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz); id. at 336  (statement of Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Hearing
on  S.  2969  before  the Senate  Committee  on  the Judiciary  , 102d  Cong.,  2d  Sess. 5-6,  14-26
(1993)  [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"]  (statement of William Yang);  id. at 27-28  (statement of
Hmong Lao Unity Ass'n., Inc.); id. at 50 (statement of BaptistJoint Committee).
18  See 42 U.S.C..  § 2000bb-1  (1993).  FHores's holding that RFRA  exceeds Congress's power
under the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily invalidate RFRA  as applied to the fed-
eral government.
1  See 521  U.S. at 529-36.  Interestingly,  the  Court held  that Congress's  Section  5 enforce-
ment powers did  extend to enforcing  the First Amendment  protection  of the free  exercise of
religon as extended to the states by Section  1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id. at 519.
See id. at 519-24.  In so ruling, the Court relied on the drafting history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and reached  a conclusion  that differs from those of some scholars.  See, e.g., John
P.  Frank and  Robert F. Munro,  The Original Understanding  of  Equal Protection of the Laws,  1972
WASH.  U.  L. Q. 421,  430  (arguing that framers of the Fourteenth Amendment  intended  that
Congress could extend the Bill of Rights under Section  5, not that Section  1 would have  self-
executing effect, enforced by the courts, of doing so); RobertJ. Kaczorowski,  Revolutionary Con-
stitutionalism  in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction,  61 N.Y. U. L. REV. 863, 867, 884-86,  912-
14  (1986)  (arguing that the drafters of Fourteenth Amendment were  more concerned  with en-
suring a constitutional  basis for Congress's authority  to protect fundamental  rights of national
citizenship than  with protecting individual  rights, and that the concern  leading  to the change
in  the wording of the Amendment  relied on  by the  Hores Court was that, without some  self-
executing  provisions, Congress  might infringe  or fall  to protect  the rights of national  citizen-
sh'R,)'See Hores,  521  U.S. at 532-35.
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garded as  proportional  to  its assertedly  remedial or preventive  objec-
tive.'9
Viewing the statute  as  a claimed  remedial  or preventative  meas-
ure, the  Court held that  RFRA could not be regarded  as  "as a  rea-
sonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as  defined
by Smith;" instead, the statute lacked "congruence between the means
used and the ends to be achieved.""g 3  Flores thus invoked  the norm of
proportionality  as an  important  test of whether  a measure  enacted
pursuant to  Section  5  of the  Fourteenth  Amendment  would be  re-
garded as a valid measure to remedy or to prevent a violation of Sec-
tion  1 of the  Fourteenth  Amendment,  or as  an  invalid  attempt  by
Congress to define the substantive meaning of Section 1.
In explaining its conclusion of nonproportionality, the Court first
noted that the  legislative  record was  virtually  bereft of contempora-
neous examples of generally-applicable  laws  passed as a  result of re-
ligious bigotry - the  type of laws that would violate the free  exercise
clause as  defined in Smith.  Instead, the focus of the legislative  hear-
ings was on "laws of general applicability which  place incidental  bur-
dens  on  religion,"  that,  under  Smith, were  constitutionally  valid.'"'
Apart from the  legislative  record,  however, and more important for
the Court, was the fact that "RFRA is so  out of proportion  to a sup-
posed remedial or preventive  object that it cannot be understood as
responsive  to,  or designed  to prevent,  unconstitutional  behavior. " "
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied on  (1)  the broad sweep
of RFRA  (2)  RFRA's lack of temporal or geographic limits; and  (3)
the rigor of the test it imposed on any government practice alleged to
burden religion and the ensuing burdens  this placed on the defend-
ing governments,'  a "considerable  congressional  intrusion  into  the
States'  traditional prerogatives  and general authority  to regulate  for
the health and welfare of their citizens...  imposing a heavy litigation
burden...  [and]  curtailing  their  traditional  general  regulatory
"197 power ....
However novel this proportionality  test may sound  to U.S.  consti-
tutional  ears,  as  described  above  the  idea  of proportionality  as  a
1'9  See id. at 532.
193  d  at 529-30.
194 Id.  (citing  the legislative  record  found  in  House  Hearings,  supra note  187,  at 331-34
(statement of Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, Hearing  on H.R.
5377 before the Subcommittee on Ciil and Constitutional  Rights of the House Committee on
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2d Sess. 49 (statement ofJohn  H. Buchanan. Jr.) Senate Hearings,
supra note 187, at 30-31  (statement of Dallin H. Oaks);  id. at 6886  (statement of Douglas  La)-
cock).  The Court noted "[t]he absence of more recent episodes  [of intentional religious  dis-
crimination] stems from the fact that, as one witness testified, 'deliberate  persecution  is  not the
usual problem in this country.'" F/ora,  521  U.S. at 530 (citing  House Hearings at 334  (statement
of Douglas Laycock)).
195  Reres 521 U.S. at 532.
196 See id. at 532-36.
197  Id.  at 534.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
measure  of the constitutionality  of laws is highly developed  in Cana-
dian constitutional law.  It is also a marked feature of German consti-
tutional law.' 9  Yet in both Canada and Germany, courts appear to in-
voke  the concept of proportionality  primarily in decisions relating to
individual rights and not in cases involving the distribution of federal
powers.'9  Awareness of this feature of Canadian case law prompts the
question whether  a proportionality  test serves  (or should  serve)  the
same function in addressing federalism  issue, like  that in F/ores, as  it
does in a free speech case like Keegstra.
If one conceives of the division of powers between the federal and
state governments  as similar to the arena of individual freedom,  that
is,  as according  rights to  each level  of government to  regulate within
their sphere, then the  concept of proportionality  can be regarded as
doing much  the  same work.  A proportionality  analysis  of a govern-
ment regulation  claimed  to violate  an individual  right asks whether
the  regulation  itself is proportional  to  the government's  asserted  le-
gitimate  goal,  and whether  the  harm  caused  to  individual  rights  is
proportional  to  the  possible benefits  of the  regulation.  Such  a  test
can be applied in more  or less deferential ways,  and with  greater or
lesser degrees of ex ante categorization.  Likewise, if one conceives of
states as having "rights" to regulate some substantive areas  (e.g.,  fam-
ily law,  inheritance  laws,  "local" commerce),  then  a proportionality
198  SeeAlexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Gennani-
zation of American Equal  Protection review, 1 PA. J. CONsT.  L. 284, 317-320  (1998)  (discussing the
German Federal Constitutional Court's clear mandate under its  "New Formula" that a strict test
of proportionality should be  applied in specified cases); see also KOMMERS,  supra note 53, at 46
(describing  proportionality  as  "crucial  to  any understanding  of German  constitutional  law,"
"play[ing]  a role similar to the American  doctrine of due process of law," an "approach ...  not
so different from the methodology often employed by the United States Supreme Court in fun-
damental  rights cases,"  involving  three steps: "determining the legitimacy of a state  purpose;"
deciding under a flexible standard whether the means used "have  the least restrictive effect...
on a constitutional  value," and deciding  whether "the  means used  [are]  proportionate  to the
end");  CURRIE,  supra note  53, at  307-10  (explaining that  the proportionality  principle  dates
back to Magna Carta and was developed by German Enlightenment  thinkers, including Svarez,
who "plainly stated  two distinct proportionality  requirements.  First,  the state  was justified  in
restricting the liberty of the individual  'only to the extent necessary for the liberty and security
of others';  Second, the evil  to  be prevented  must be substantially  greater  than  the attendant
harm  to individual liberty ....  [This]  insiste[nce]  on proportionality both between  ends and
means and between costs and benefits  [is]  reflected in the jurisprudence  of the Constitutional
Court.").
199 See  HOGG,  CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  OF  CANADA,  supra note  46,  at  805-06  (distinguishing
"characterization" of a law's "pith and substance" on federalism-based  challenge,  from charac-
terization of a law challenged under the Charter's individual  rights provisions, with more focus
on the law's effects in Charter review);  CURRIE, supra  note 53, at 307-10  (linking proportionality
in German law to individual rights issues).  But see BEATIY, supra note 78, at 36-39  (arguing that
Canadian  federalism  cases have developed  concept of proportionality, although without using
that term  itself, as a basic tool for measuring scope  of federal government  and provincial  pow-
ers).  In Australia and the European  Union, proportionality has been invoked in cases dealing,
respectively, with  the  characterization  of the powers  of the federal  and state  governments,  and
with  whether  regulatory  action  of the European  Union  organs  is  authorized  by the  relevant
treaties.
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analysis  of federal  regulation  could  ask  whether  the  regulation  is
proportional  to  the  federal  government's  asserted  legitimate  objec-
tive, and whether the  harm  caused to  the states'  right to  regulate is
proportional to the benefits of federal regulation. "
Critical to such an application of proportionality analysis  to feder-
alism issues is the premise that there exists a definable  allocation  of
"rights"  to  regulate  in  certain  areas  assigned  to  the  sub-national
level(s) of government.  But if states do not have "rights," analogous
to individual rights, to regulate in particular areas,-'  then the consti-
tutional judgment being sought should differ.2  If one conceives  of
the arena of state government power  to regulate  private  activities as
an area that is defined in large part by the exercise of federal power,
flexible, and changing over time, then proportionality anal)sis should
have a smaller role to play in federalism-based  challenges to  the con-
stitutionality of national action.  If states have no "right" to retain ex-
clusive legislative  authority over particular areas, what  is the baseline
against which  to measure  the  proportionality of harm  to something
analogous to a constitutional rightsss One could still inquire whether
the measure is proportional to the asserted legitimate purpose of the
federal governmental activity and to the harms caused  to state inter-
ests.2°4  But this inquiry could be either very diffuse, very intrusive, or
both.  Without a baseline  measure of a "right" to regulate, or a  rule
constraining the level of detail of federal enactments  (which exists in
some constitutional  systems but not in the United States),  applica-
.0  For an argument that proportionality (and other) principles in Canada have been used  to
increase the concurrent powers of both federal and proincial governments, see B,M.  supra
note 78, at 25-29, and also see HOGG,  CONSIMMTIOtoAL LAw OF C.MDA,  supra note 46,  at 377-
85  (describing the Court's techniques of characterisation  and recognition of multiple purposes
to uphold areas that are, in effect, of concurrent federal-provincal  powers).
- For discussion,  see Jackson,  Federa/ism, supra note  36,  at 2231-33.  2252-53  (arguing  that
states do not have constitutionally protected  enclaves of power to regulate private activity  free
from federal intervention  but that states'  maintenance of their own executive,  legislative,  and
judicial branches is constitutionally protected).
Proportionality  analysis could still,  in theory, address the  underl)ing  policy question  by
comparing the  costs and benefits  of centralization  (through  national legislation)  to those  of
decentralization.  Yet, absent some legal directive or standard to guide this determination. it  is
difficult to see why on a pure cost benefit analysis one would prefer a court's judgment to that
of the legislature.
M" In Australia, as in the United States, there are  few, if any, explicit powers reserved  to the
States.  At least one Australian jurist has criticized  the use of proportionality  to protect stateju-
risdiction as such, while offering guarded support for its use to test the validity of the  charac-
terization" of federal  laws as falling within  federal powers (at least when  those powers  are lim-
ited by a requirement of a particular purpose).  SeeKirk, supra note 154. at 36-37,41-42.
0  Greater levels of application and detail may be seen as more intrusive on states'  regulatory
authority, and thus as bearing on the degree of injury  to the states'  interests.  Yet,  if states do
not have constitutionally protected  rights to exercise regulatory authority free of federal inter-
vention, on what constitutional basis could courts interfere with the national legislature's leewny
to accomplish  its goals  provided there  is a sufficient  connection  to a  national  enumerated
power?  SegenerallyMcCulloch  v. Maryland,  17 U.S.  (4 Mheat.)  316 (1819).
-0 In Germany, there are subjects on which the federal  government  may enact  'frantework
statutes" that must leave substantial room for the subnational units (called 1"nder) to enact lawsJOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
tion of proportionality  review  to  federalism-based  challenges  to  na-
tional power should be highly deferential  to  legislative judgments in
order  to  minimize  risks  of judicial  invalidation  based  on  disagree-
ment over "policy" issues concerning the scope of federal regulation.
One could still ask, though, whether the federal law is plausibly re-
lated to a subject over which the federal government has power to act
- a  basic requisite  of constitutional  government  being  that govern-
ments act  only as  they are  authorized  by law.16  Understood  in  this
sense,  the proportionality  test of  Mores could function as  a more  re-
spectful version of a "purpose" or "legitimate ends" test 2 07  (similar in
some ways to the Canadian  "pith and substance"  test 2 0 s for evaluating
whether the federal  government, or the provinces,  have  authority to
legislate on particular issues).  A disproportional law may be a law not
really designed for one asserted purpose but to sweep more  broadly
or in other directions. 2 9  In this sense, Fores's proportionality test may
be a reinvigoration  of the  "legitimate end" test of McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 21 0  through a mechanism  perhaps  less difficult to  administer, in
light of the challenges of identifying a collective  legislative intent and
the reluctance  of courts to attribute improper motives to a coordinate
branch of government.  But, using "proportionality" as a surrogate for "purpose" in the federalism context requires a highly deferential
filling in the details.  See BASic  LAW FOR THE FEDERAL  REPUBLIC OF  GERMANY,  Art. 75  (Official
translation, revised edition,  March 1995)  (providing that "the Federation has the right to enact
framework legislation for legislation of the MInder on" a number of subjects, including "general
principles of higher education,"  "the general legal status of the press," and "land distribution,"
and further providing  that "Framework legislation  may  only in exceptional  cases contain  de-
tailed or directly applicable provisions," and imposing duty on lfinder to introduce  implement-
inegislation in timely fashion).
20  SeeJackson,  Federalism, supra  note 36, at 2224-25.
For a discussion of surrogates for purpose tests in U.S. constitutional law, see Fallon,  supra
note 176, at 94-95  (examining content-based  and effects-based  tests  as substitutes  for purpose
test).  Cf Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1976)  (noting that a law's disproportionate
imgact  may bear on whether the law will be found to have an impermissible purpose).
See, e.g.,  Labatt Breweries v. Attorney Gen.  [1980]  1 S.C.R. 914; HOGG,  CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 377 et seq. (discussing "pith and substance" test to "character-
ize"  the leading feature,  or true nature  and character, of the challenged  law).  Hogg further
states that the "pith and substance" test is not used to evaluate  claims that Charter rights have
been  infringed but rather  to evaluate whether federal  and provincial  laws  are within  their re-
spective heads of power.  Id.  at 377 n.21.
Cf Note, supra  note  110, at 124-25 (analyzing Eisenstadt v. Baird).
20 See 17  U.S.  (4 Wheat.)  316, 421  (1819)  ("Let the end  be legitimate,  let it be within  the
scope of the  constitution,  and all  means which are appropriate,  which  are  plainly adapted  to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are
constitutional.").
2  See Fallon,  supra note  176, at  131-32  (treating Flores' Section  5  analysis  as resting on  a
"purpose" test).  Recall suggestions  in early constitutional cases in the U.S. that different  "pur-
poses" could authorize  federal and state regulation of the same area,  see, e.g.,  Wilson v. Black-Bird
Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2  Pet.) 245 (1829)  (upholding state law draining creek for health  pur-
poses  though action  might block federally-licensed  interstate  navigation)  and  Hogg's sugges-
tion  that  the  "pith  and  substance"  test  serves  a  similar  purpose  in  Canada.  See  HOGG,
CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW OF CANADA, supra note 46, at 378.
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stance  towards  Congress's use of its powers,  to be  overcome  only in
the presence of a very clear disproportionality between legitmate end
and chosen means.
Assume for the moment that one agreed with  Smith's view on the
scope of the Free Exercise Clause and further agreed with Flores'view
that Congress's only role in Section 5  was to  remedy or prevent Sec-
tion  I  violations  as  the  Court  defined  them.  On  these  large  as-
sumptions, the conclusion that followed - that this statute could not
be upheld as an effort to prevent or remedy those kinds of violations
- seems  quite  plausible.  Notwithstanding  early critique  of the  pro-
portionality standard that it offers "little if any principled guidance as
to where  the line will be drawn in any particular case,'  the Court's
conclusion that RFRA sweeps  more  broadly than  a  law  designed  to
prevent what the  Court  would find to be invidiously  motivated  inter-
ferences with religious freedom seems reasonable, in light of the leg-
islative record's suggestion that the principal problem to which  RFRA
was directed was the adverse  effect on minority religious practices  of
neutral, generally-applicable  statutes.. 2
"  Application of a proportion-
212 See also Kirk, supra note 154, at 41  (suggesting that courts in Australia use proportionality
"as indicative of purpose" by asking "whether the imbalance, or availability of alternative means.
was of such a dear,  gross or overahdming  nature  as to prevent the measure reasonably being char-
acterized as having been made  with respect to the claimed  legitimate purpose")  (emphasis  in
original); HOGG,  CONSTITLIONAL  LAW OF CANADA,  supra note 46. at 390  (arguing for judicial
restraint in invalidating laws on federalism grounds where the choice  between competing char-
acterizations is not  dear).  Cf.  Dolan v. City of  Tigard, 512 U.S.  374. 403 (1994)  (StevensJ., dis-
senting)  (suggesting  that the test of proportionality of land use  condition  to costs  created  b,
landowner's proposed change is appropriate  "only if the developer  establishes that a conced-
edly germane  condition is so grossly disproportionate  to the proposed development's  adverse
effects that it manifests motives other than land use regulation on the part of tie  city.).
213 But see infra part IV below  (questioning these aspects  of Flores  especially  in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment's explicit reliance on Congress to enforce its substantive provisions).
214 See Cole, supra, note 71, at 229; see also Noonan, supra note  71, at 470-71  (criticizing pro-
portionality test as unprecedented and without meaning).  Interestingly,  Noonan has elsewhere
described the role of proportionality in the principle of "double effect"  JOjN T.  NOO.NN,JL.,
THE  LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE  AMERICAN EXPERIENcE  AND REUGIOUS FREEDOM 203  (1993)
(describing principle of "double effect'  which "supposes one action,  one good intention, and
two simultaneous effects, one good and one bad; and  to be moral the bad  effect must be unin-
tended and not be greater than the good effect  In other words, a judgment is required  that
the bad is not disproportionate  to the good").  Noonan's dialogue considers whether  this prin-
ciple  could  guide  public decisions  about  government accommodation  of religion,  but ulti-
mately the principal interrogator concludes not. See i&.  at 205-06  (raising concerns about the
workability and subjectivity of the approach).
2  Note that there are at least three  kinds of constitutional  decisions  involved  in the Fores
Court's federalism-based  analysis of RFRA:  first, whether  "disproportionate impact'  practices
are prohibited by the  Free Exercise  Clause; second, whether one can draw an inference  con-
cerning what the Court would recognize as discriminatory intent from the enactment  of  statutes
that are facially-neutral  but have  a disproportionate  impact; and  finally, assuming a plausible
basis for finding a violation of the substantive provisions,  what means can  Congress design  to
combat it.  On all  three of these  issues, the Congress and  the Court may  have had  different
vieus.  For an effort tojustify RFRA as preventing invidious treatment of minority religions.  see
Laycocl  supra note 71 at 771-79  (arguing that Smith, together with  Church of the Luhumi Balalu
Aye,  Ina v. City of  Hialeah, 508 U.S.  520  (1993),  should not be read  to require proof of hostileJOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ality test might reasonably lead  the Court  to  conclude  that the  pur-
ported remedial justification - that the statute was needed  to prevent
invidiously-intended,  bad  treatment  of minority  religious  groups -
was a fictive fig leaf or an after-the-fact justification  designed to paper
over  the  real  contest  - a disagreement  between  Congress  and  the
Court on the meaning of religious liberty.1
Having  said this,  one might still  be troubled  about whether  the "proportionality and  congruence"  standard  of Flores contemplates  a
more activist role forjudicial review than has developed under McCul-
loch's standard for reviewing whether federal  legislation is within fed-
eral power.217  One might be particularly  concerned  in light  of the
U.S. history  of review  of the  "appropriateness"  of civil  rights legisla-
tion so rigorous as to undermine  the egalitarian goals of the Recon-
struction Amendments. 8  Canadian  (and European)  proportionality
analyses in individual rights cases suggest that it might be rational, if
not wise,  to  take  an action  that could  not meet the  more  rigorous
formulations  of proportionality  testing. 219  But a look at the  constitu-
tional jurisprudence  of Australia  offers  a way of thinking about  the
proportionality standard that may be useful, cabining proportionality
analysis  to a highly deferential inquiry in which only gross dispropor-
tionality would  be  a basis for invalidation,  essentially  as a  surrogate
motive  if a statute provided  less favorable  treatment  to religiously motivated  than  to secularly
motivated  conduct through statutory exemptions, and accordingly  there exist a larger number
of laws that should not be regarded as "generally applicable"  and a more substantial  number of
constitutional violations than k/ores assumed).
216  In  Rores, Respondent  Archbishop  Flores argued  in favor  of the  constitutionality of  the
RFRA in part  on the ground that the legislation was designed  to prevent difficult-to-prove  in-
vidious  religious  discrimination in violation  of the Equal Protection Clause  of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See 521  U.S.  507, 529  (1997); Brief of Respondent  Flores at 23-24, Flores (No. 95-
2074).  Petitioner's Reply Brief argued that defending RFRA as a statute that enforces the Equal
Protection Clause was "a pretext," and argued  that the Court could invalidate the statute as hav-
ing an improper "purpose" without entailing a difficult inquiry into legislative  "motive."  See Re-
ply Brief of Petitioner at 4, Rores (No. 95-2074).
217  For academic comment to the effect that the standard is more rigorous, see, for example,
McConnell,  Institutions and Interpretation, supra  note  71,  at 165;  Laycock, supra note  71,  at 770;
but cf  Ira C.  Lupu,  Why  the Congress Was Wrong and the Court Was Right - Reflections on City  of
Boerne v.  Flores, 39  WMa.  & MARY L.  REV.  793, 815  (1998)  (arguing that while  a "rigorous  re-
quirement of congruence" would  be "revolutionary,"  "narrower readings of Rlores exist and in-
volve less tension with" constitutional  tradition).
218  See, e.g., The Civil Rights Cases,  109 U.S. 3,  10-15  (1883)  (holding unconstitutional  federal
law prohibiting  race  discrimination  by inns and other public places, and  narrowly  construing
Fourteenth Amendment, in light of Tenth Amendment, to reach only "state action of a praticu-
lar character");  United  States  v.  Cruikshank,  92  U.S.  542,  557  (1875)  (construing  the  Fotur-
teenth Amendment  narrowly and  invalidating  indictment for interfence  with  the  right  to  as-
semble).
219  See,  e.g.,  RJR  MacDonald,  Inc. v.  Canada  [1995]  3 S.C.R.  199,  342-48  (McLachlin,  J.)
(striking down prohibition on all tobacco  advertisements;  while legislation was rational  means
toward  legitimate goal  of reducing smoking, the  complete bar could not be  sustained  under
Charter section  1 because  it did not minimally impair free  expression  rights, the government
not having explained why a partial bar on "lifestyle" advertising designed to increase  consump-
tion, but not on "brand preference"  advertising directed at existing smokers to increase market
share, would not have been as effective).
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for purpose analysis.
In Australia,  the idea of proportionality  has  been  applied  to  re-
view  challenges  to  federal  action  as  outside  the  scope  of federal
power.  Australian  writers  describe  the  concept  as  inspired  by  the
European Court ofJustice and European Court of Human Rights' ju-
risprudence.2  Jeremy Kirk, an Australian scholar, has suggested that
the concept of proportionality has different  roles to  play in  federal-
ism  as compared  to individual rights  cases.  He argues that in assess-
ing whether an act of the federal government "can be characterized
as having a sufficient link" to a head of federal  power "to be valid,"
proportionality  can serve  as  "an objective  test of purpose."2'  In  as-
sessing the validity  of a "purposive"  federal  power,  he suggests,  ele-
ments of the proportionality  test must be employed more narrowly.
"[t]he  court would have  to ask whether availability of less restrictive
means,  or the  imbalance  [of benefits  and  harms],  was  of such  an
overwhelming nature  as to make it clear  that the  law could not rea-
sonably be  characterized  as  having  been  made  with  respect  to  the
claimed legitimate purpose. "2
In other words, the argument  is that courts should - in  order to
avoid inappropriate  second-guessing  of legislative  decision-making -
invalidate  laws  as  outside  federal  power  only  where  the  law  is  so
grossly disproportionate  to the asserted goal as to  cast doubt on the
validity of the purported purpose.  In order to avoid  a quagmire  of
constitutional  uncertainty  in  the  U.S.  constitutional  setting,  given
both  the  lack  of discrete  areas  reserved  to  the  states  as  matters  of
regulatory jurisdiction  and  the  constitutionally-protected  participa-
tion of states in constituting the federal government2  a judicial  pol-
20  See M  inister for Resources v. Dover Fisheries Pry Ltd, 116 AuLPR.  54  (1993);  see also Kirk.
supra note  154, at 2.  For a detailed description of proportionality as a concept in the European
Union, see EMIIIOU, supra note 78, at 115-265.
22  See Kirk supra  note 154, at 2, 6.  In Australia the process of determining  'hether a federal
law is supported by one of its enumerated  powers is referred to as "characterization.'  For im-
plied or incidental  powers, analogous to those contemplated  by the US. Necessary and Proper
Clause, purpose is always relevant  See id. at 22 (citations omiued).  Other enumerated po-wers,
although  not all  of them, are  deemed  to  have  a  purposiveness  requirement,  including  the
power over external affairs and defense.  Proportionality in Australia has  been used  to deter-
mine whether a law can be "characterisable  as in fact adapted to achieve" a legitimate purpose.
Id. at 22;  see also H.P.  Lee,  Proportionaliy  in Austmlian  Constitutional  Adjudication, in FLTL'RE
DIRECrIONS  IN  AUSTRALUAN  CONSTrrLTONAL LW:  EssMs  IN  HONOUR  OF  PROFEsSOR  LESUE
ZINSS 126, 130-31  (Geoffrey  Lindell, ed. 1994)  (noting the similarity between established "pro-
portionality" test to determine validity of regulations in administrative law,  and its use to deter-
mine constitutionality of national  legislation).  While acknowledging  concern  that  a propor-
tionality test could  invite judges impermissibly to intrude on  legislative functions,  Lee  argues
that somejudicial review of the "degree" of  connection between legislative action and legislative
power is necessary to hold the legislature to rule of law standards.  Lee, supra,  at  148.
Kirk, supra note 154, at 24-25.
2n  For a classic statement, see Herbert Wechsler, The Political  Safeguards  of Federalism. The Role
of the States in the Composition and  Seetion of  the National Gormmmnt, 54 COLUM.  L  R  '. 543, 559-
60  (1954)  (Court is on the weakest ground in opposing its view of Constitution to that of Con-
gress  in  the  interests  of  the  states);  see  also, JESSE  R  CHOPER,  JUDICIAL  REiEW  .D  THEJOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
icy  of highly  deferential  review  of exercises  of federal  power  (not
claimed  to violate  individual  fights)  makes sense.  While  Congress's
institutional  attention  to  the  needs  and  interests  of  the  different
states is not a reason for refraining from judicial review altogether, it
is a reason for highly deferential judicial review. 4  With  this impor-
tant caveat - that the proportionality of congressional  means  to  the
claimed purpose  is reviewed  with  considerable  deference 225  - the in-
troduction of the  concept  of proportionality  in  Flores could be rela-
tively  benign. 226  It  certainly  provides  an  occasion  for  further  com-
parative  reflection on the use of this concept elsewhere and its (some
might say) strange absence from U.S. constitutional law.
I recognize the strength of David Cole's point that a proportional-
ity test does not tell where  the line will be drawn. 2
'  But, such a  test
NATIONAL POLITICAL  PROCESS  171-259  (1980)  (arguing that federalism-based  challenges  to na-
tional power should be nonjusticiable).
24  See generally Jackson,  Federalism, supra  note  36, at 2226-28  & n.206,  2230-55.  A distinctive
feature  of current U.S. constitutional  law may also  identify a particular function  for the Flores
proportionality  test:  Federal regulation  of state governments  as such  under Article  I  powers,
(e.g. commerce  clause)  may be  permitted  (notwithstanding the  anti-commandeering  rule  of
Printz) if the  federal statute even-handedly  applies to private entities as  well.  See New York v.
United States, 505 U.S.  144, 178  (1992).  For purposes of the Commerce Clause, the distinction
between federal commands  to states as such, and federal regulations that fall even-handedly on
states  and  private  entities  engaged  in  the same  behavior,  can be  defended  on  a number  of
grounds as providing  adequate protection  to the states from federal regulation  that interferes
with their ability  to function  as independent  governments.  SeeJackson,  Federalism, supra note
36, at 2206-07.  But federal  regulation  under  the Fourteenth Amendment, unlike most Com-
merce Clause  regulations,  is necessarily  directed at state  power. See The Civil Rights Cases,  109
U.S. 3 (1883).  Given the very purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to constrain  the exercise
of governmental  power, it would  not make sense  to extend the "regulate  like private  entities"
rationale,  by which  the  Court  has,  provisionally,  maintained  the  possibility  of congressional
regulation  of states when  acting under Article  I powers,  to congressional  enforcement  of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  If Congress's  Fourteenth Amendment  power  to  define prohibited
state action under Section  1 were unlimited, Congress would have unlimited power to eliminate
state governments'  independence.  To the extent that, even after enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment,  state governments  retain  a role  as  institutional  counterbalances  to  Congress,  it
would be inconsistent to allow Congress to destroy the states.  The F/ares requirement of propor-
tionality, properly administered, might thus be a substitute for constraints on Congress's regula-
tion of the states in other areas, and justified by the  need to assure  that the  national  govern-
ment cannot  destroy  the  state  governments,  while  at  the  same  time  allowing  the  federal
government ample  latitude to prohibit the states from engaging  in practices that arguably vio-
late the provisions of Section  1.
Cf. Lee, supra note 221,  at 131,  148-49  (arguing for  proportionality  review  of legislation
"bolstered by a measure ofjudicial deference").
226 Fores  also  has the potential to be considerably less than benign; a broad  reading of its  ra-
tionale  could threaten  the constitutionality  of, for example,  applying  to the states Title  Vll's
"disparate impact" approach, or the Pregnancy  Discrimination Act, both of which provide for
relief on a showing that would  not necessarily meet the Supreme  Court's standards  for estab-
lishing violations of the Equal Protection Clause.  See generally Laycock, supra  note 71, at 747-58.
While both of these statutes may be sustainable  as even-handed regulations  of states as  employ-
ers, see supra  note 224  (discussing  New  York v. United States, 505 U.S.  144 (1992))  to the extent
they are grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment  F/ores  poses some risk (though perhaps more
from  the Court's holding that Congress cannot go  beyond the Court's  definition of what Sec-
tion 1 prohibits than its holding on proportionality).
W  SeeCole, supra  note 71, at 47.
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does permit one to  say that some statutes  are a closer fit, are  more
proportional,  to a constitutional  wrong, than are  others.  And  ulti-
mately, isn't what  is enough  of a fit a question  of judgment  under
many of the tests?  How rigorously proportionality will be applied may
depend on the  degree  of deference  given  to  Congress's  determina-
dons - whether  Congress behaved  rationally in concluding  that the
statute  was  proportional,  or whether  some  more  rigorous standard
will be applied (which I would not favor).-  In Flores, however, Con-
gress's  main motivation  in some  sense was  a disagreement  with  the
Smith Court on what  counts  as  a substantive  violation.229  Thus,  the
standard of deference was  arguably irrelevant:  proportionality  in l/o-
res was being  used  as  an  alternative  to  screening  for impermissible
legislative purpose.
Does this discussion mean that the U.S.  Supreme Court was either
right or wrong in adopting a proportionality test in  Flores?  Perhaps
neither.  Ultimately,  courts and commentators cannot avoid  coming
to  grips with  the  historical  reverberations  of particular  approaches
For a discussion of the basis forjudicial  deference  to  Congress  in reviewing  federalism-
based challenges  to congressional  action, see Jackson, Federalism,  supra note 36. at 2227.  (argu-
ing that Herbert Wechsler's  argument that the structure of the national  political  process cre-
ated by the Constitution tended to assure that states'  interests were considered  by Congress still
has much merit, and that federal constitutional arrangements require a certain  pragmatic give
in thejoints to function effectively over time).
While it may be somewhat more  rigorous than the "mere rationality* standard,  propor-
tionality review in the Fourteenth Amendment context,  if  limited to instances of grns  disproper-
tionaliti,  may do little seriously to impair Congress's power creatively to insist that states provide
equal protection and due process of law to all.  Note that the Flores Court refers with approval to
its earlier decision in South Carolina  v. Katenbach, 383 U.S. 301,334  (1966)  (upholding the Vot-
ing Rights Act's suspension of literacy tests for five years in light of evidence  that such  tests had
been used to exclude  blacks from voting, and a concern that their use would freeze the effects
of past intentional discrimination  in the voter rolls).  Moreover,  the Court in South Carolina n,.
Katzenbach upheld a provision suspending  any change  in state voting  rules or practices  until
federal authorities had reviewed them, a novel and intrusive step justified, the Court said, by the
"extraordinary stratagem" states had in the past and might in the future adopt to exclude  citi-
zens from voting because of their race.  329 U.S. at 334, 329-31.  While the Court did not explic-
itly refer  to proportionality,  its suggestion  that extraordinary  resistance justifies  unusual  re-
sponses, is consistent with the approach.
Other rationales  that may sustain the requirement of proportionality go to whether efforts
to promote the free exercise of religion by mandating accommodation  would violate the prohi-
bitions on federal establishment of religion.  See R/reo,  521  U.S. at 536-37  (Stevens, J. concur-
ring);  cf. Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentaianism  IWay  RFRA  Reat  Was  Unwonstitutiona  95
MicH. L. REv. 2347  (1997)  (arguing that RFRA violates Establishment Clause).  On whether the
inquiry  itself might be  incompatible  with the judicial  role, see  Mark Tuslnet,  Tuo  1  rsins of
Judicial  Supremac,  39 WM.  &  MARY L  REV.  945, 947-48  (1998).  See  aLso forrs, 521  U.S.  at 513
(discussing the  Court's  evaluation  and  rejection, in  Smith, of the  Sherbert standard  which  re-
quired courts to determine whether a particular practice was central  to an individual's religion
- a determination that, according to the Court, is "not within the judicial ken') (quelingShuth,
494 U.S.  at 887).  This  article  does not address  these  arguments other than  to  note that  for
those who believe that the two prongs of the religion clauses can come into conflict with  each
other at points of accommodation,  this may provide an additional  reason to identify some  test
for the validity of congressional  power apart from the rational basis test into which MeCullazh v.
Marfyland, 17 U.S.  (4 Wheat) 316  (1819),  had developed.JOURNAL OF  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
within  their own  polities.  In  this light, the  nineteenth  century  U.S.
Court's hobbling of enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments
stands as  an important caution  in embracing "proportionality analy-
sis"  of federalism-based  challenges  to  national laws,  particularly  out-
side  the  above-discussed  inquiry  into  "gross  disproportionality."
Knowledge  of the  strikingly  comparable  developments  of "propor-
tionality" as a concept in other constitutional  systems,  however,  and
of their  more  intricate  articulations  of the  proportionality  test  (in
both individual rights and federalism  issues)  can inform  decision  of
the  range  of  consequences  for  adoption  of  this  approach  in  the
United States.
IV.  FLORES, COMPARATIVE SOURCES
AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL  CONVERSATION
Fores  is relevant to this article not only in its use of proportionality
as a concept in constitutional law, but also in another way: it suggests
that the  Court may, at times, be unecessarily  close-minded  in  its ap-
preciation of congressional input on constitutional interpretation  in
ways not unconnected  to its resistance  to comparative  constitutional
influences.
There  is  much room for disagreement  with  the F/ores Court.  Its
reliance  on  the  drafting  history of the  Fourteenth  Amendment  for
the proposition that Congress was not intended  to  play a role in de-
fining  the  substantive  reach  of the  Section  1  rights  is  based  on  a
highly contestable  reading of that history.20 And the scope of the free
exercise clause itself is a difficult question, the Smith decision, leaving
many constitutional scholars, as well as politicians, deeply troubled.'
But here I would like to consider arguments made by both  David
Cole and  Michael McConnell, 232  that the Court's assertion of judicial
230 Compare City of Boerne v.  Flores, 521 U.S.  507, 520-24  (arguing that redrafting of provi-
sions of Section  1 was designed to allay fears  that Congress would have  too much power)  with
McConnell,  Institutions and Interpretation,  supra note  71,  at  177-81  (arguing that the redrafted
provision does not as a matter of language reduce Congress's power and was not understood  by
its drafters  to do so). The Court's suggestion  that its interpretation  of Sections  1 and 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,  as limiting Congress to the design of remedial  legislation, but not to a
role in defining the substantive scope  of Section  1, is "significant also in maintaining the tradi-
tional separation of powers between  the Congress and thejudiciary,"  Fores,  521  U.S. at 523-24,
is peculiarly circular.  It could be argued  that the Fourteenth Amendment changed those  rela-
tionsjust as it changed  federal state-relations,  to the extent contemplated  by the Amendment.
Indeed, since  the Fourteenth Amendment was designed in part to overturn Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 101 Howard 393 (1857)  such a reading is hardly implausible.
See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free  Exercise Revisionism and  the Smith Decision,  57 U. Ctii. L.
REV. 1109  (1990)  [hereinafter, McConnell,  Free Exercise Revisionism]; see also Christopher  L. Eis-
gruber and Lawrence  G.  Sager,  Why  the Religious Freedom Restoration Act  is  Unconstitutional,  69
N.Y.U. L. REV.  437, 442-45  (1994)  (criticizing  the Court's decision  in Employment  Division v.
Smith, but also arguing against RFRA).
22  See Cole, supra note 71, at 59-64  (arguing that Congress has particular institutional  compe-
tence in interpreting the Constitution that should be given more deference  than did the Bores
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supremacy in  interpretation need not have been accompanied by the
implicit claim ofjudicial exclusivity in interpretation of constitutional
provisions or by what appeared as a studied refusal  to reconsider the
constitutional  question of Smith in light  of Congress's  findings  and
concerns.2s  Given Congress's explicit constitutional  role in enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment,  the  Court might  have  found  congres-
sional views relevant, particularly since the Court itself was closely di-
vided in  Smith.  Instead,  the  Court suggested  that  Congress  should
have  recognized  the stare decisis principles  that would mandate judi-
cial adherence  to  Smith and implied  that Congress should not  have
challenged  the  Court's  decision  in  Smith  through  enactment  of a
statute premised, in part, on disagreement with Smith."
But, was it inappropriate for Congress to test the limits of both the
Smith principle, and of stare decisis, by enacting legislation that rested,
in part, on a different constitutional theory?
This argument,  while  only implicit in  Flores, is related  to  the ar-
guments  made  by the  plurality in Planned Parenthood v.  Casey,  - that
the  Court should adhere  to certain  past decisions  particularly when
confronted  with  political pressure  to  change  an  existing interpreta-
tion.2m  Critics counter  that, particularly  because  it is  a  constitution
being expounded,  the  Court should change its interpretation  when
persuaded that it is wrong  (and can  make the change without unset-
Court); McConnell, Institutions and Intrpretation,  supra note  71,  at 155-56,  171-74  (arguing that
the independent judgment of Congress on a constitutional question  is relev,-t  to judicial  in-
terpretation, especially in areas, such as the Free Exercise  Clause, where there is plausible  sup-
port for multiple interpretations).
See Rores, 521  U.S.  at 515  (describing floor debates  in which  members of Congress  dis-
cussed points of constitutional  interpretation and criticized  the Court's reasoning  in Smith); id.
at 536 (stating that once the Court has interpreted  the Constitution, the political branches 'act
against  the  background of [that]  interpretation"  and  that "RFRA  contradicts  vital  principles
necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance").  The Court indicated that
once it had made a  constitutional  decision,  it "will  treat  its precedents  with  tie respect  due
them under settled principles, including stare derisis, and contrary expectations  must be disap-
pointed."  Id.  Thus, the  Court rather  clearly implies  that the more  expansihe  viuws of rights
protected expressed by Congress in subsequent legislation are irrelevant.
Interestingly, Justice O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justice  Breyer, seems to agree.  She
wrote that if she did not disagree with Smith, she would have joined dte part of die Court's opin-
ion in which this discussion  is found because "when  [Congress]  enacts  legislation in  further-
ance of its delegated  powers,  Congress must make  its judgments consistent  wiith  this  Court's
exposition of the Constitution  and with the limits placed  on  its legislative  authoritn  i,  provi-
sions such as the Fourteenth Amendment."  Hora,  521  U.S. at 545-46. justice O'Connor's posi-
tion is surprising, since she also  argues that the case should be used as a  ehicle  to reconsider
Smith, and notes that stare  dedsis  is not a barrier to reconsideration  because  Simth is "demonstra-
bly wrong" and "is a recent decision  [that]  has not engendered  dte kind of reliance on its con-
tinued  application  that would  militate  against  overruling  it."  I&  at  548.  Why,  if justice
O'Connor believes that the Court could appropriately overrule  Smith, would it be inappropriate
for Congress to provide such an opportunity to the Court through the enactment of RFRk:.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
See i&t at 867 ("[T]o overrule  under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason  to
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitinmcy  bevond an  serious ques-
tion.").JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
fling  reliance  interests  on  which  law  and  political  arrangements
rest) .237  If this critique of the stare decisis argument in  Casey is correct,
afortiori  it cannot be the case that the political branches are bound by
separation  of powers principles  not to legislate  on  a  plausible,  com-
peting constitutional theory.
It is not so much the assertion ofjudicial supremacy in interpreta-
tion  with  which  I  am  concerned,  2 8 but rather  the  suggestion  that
Congress violates the separation of powers in enacting a statute prem-
ised on a different constitutional  theory and the implication that the
Court should refuse  to consider Congress's views on substantive ques-
tions.  The  latter, at least,  raises echoes  of the  Printz Court's unwill-
ingness  to  consider foreign  constitutional practices in resolving U.S.
constitutional questions.  In the one case, foreign constitutional  deci-
sions might be worthy of consideration  because they reflect reasoned
judgments  of  other judges  faced  with  similar  problems. 239  In  the
other,  congressional  views  of the  Constitution  might  be worthy  of
note because  they come from a coordinate branch  carrying  out con-
stitutional responsibilities  of lawmaking and because they may reflect
substantial  general understandings of constitutional meanings.  Con-
stitutional adjudication probably cannot depart too far and too often
from such understandings.
Should  the practices  and views  of foreign  constitutional  systems,
of the state courts, or of the Congress, be dispositive or controlling in
constitutional  adjudication?  Surely not.  Although  compelling  argu-
ments exist for why Congress  should  have ample latitude  to  address
237  See Casey, 505 U.S.  at 954-57  (Rehnqist, CJ., dissenting);  see also ChristopherJ. Peters Fool-
ish Consistency: On Equality, Integrity, and  Justice in Stare Decisis, 105  YALE  L. J.  2031,  2046  n.71
(1996)  (stating that as a ground for not overruling, controversiality  of prior decisions "becomes
absurd if taken  literally").  But cf. Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudidal  Con-
stitutional  Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV.  1539  (1997)  (arguing that what the Supreme Court
says must be treated as binding all other actors in order to serve the "coordination" functions of
having a final  decision-maker  that constitutionalism  requires).  For a response see Tushnet, su-
pra note  229,  at 952-59  (challenging Alexander  and  Schauer's  conclusion  that courts  rather
than legislature should play "settlement" function).
238 One might believe that the Court's  decision on constitutional  matters  must have  priority
over the  views of other branches of government, and still believe that  the system must be struc-
tured to  allow opportunities for the views and positions of the other branches  in disagreement
with  the Court to be considered  by the Court through subsequent legal challenges.
2s9 Cf  Dolan v.  City of Tigard, 512 U.S.  374, 389  (1994)  (relying upon state court decisions
about when  a government  regulation  is a taking  as an appropriate  guide to development  of a
distinctive  federal  rule  requiring  "proportionality"  between  the conditions  imposed  and  the
benefits sought when  a property owner requests a land use variance).  The  Court's occasional
willingness to consider the views of the state courts on constitutional questions  typically litigated
there provides  one model for considering  the views of other constitutional  courts.  One might
distinguish the Court's  consideration of state cases from consideration  of foreign decisions  on
the ground  that state courts address identical  issues under  the identical constitution,  whereas
foreign decisions  necessarily  address different  constitutions, even  where the constitutional lan-
guage  is purportedly similar. But see Dolan, 512 U.S. at 398  (Stevens, J., dissenting)  (pointing
out that none of the state court cases announced  anything akin to the Court's "rough propor-
tionality" rule  and noting that most of the state court cases cited  by the majority relied on state
law or other unspecified grounds, rather than on the federal Constitution).
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what it sees as constitutional  violations  under Section  1 in  the exer-
cise  of its Section  5  power,  to  construe  the  provision  as  affording
Congress unfettered  and unreviewable  choice would  probably yield
too  much  power  to  maintain  a  constitutional  balance.  Moreover,
wel-reasoned  and explained  Court  decisions  can  influence  public
and congressional understanding of the Constitution.
But  are  Congress's  views  on  constitutional  meaning  irrelevant,
and  impermissible,  on  the  question  of scope?  I  would  think  not.
Even the Court's view recognizes that the purported dividing line be-
tween substance and remedy is an uncertain one, and yields substan-
tial deference  to Congress on preventive and remedial issues.  Being
aware of Congress's considered views on the meaning of a substantive
provision might well be relevant to sound constitutional adjudication,
which, at least in reference to federalism issues, is an exercise of gov-
ernance that must be both principled and pragmatic.  2
Why, then, the Court's tone of rebuke to Congress in Flores, and of
parochialism  in Printz.  Maybe just happenstance,  but perhaps  they
are symptoms of current  anxieties about the role of the Court, and of
U.S. judicial  review,
24 1  to which I alluded earlier.  Congress has chal-
lenged the Court's interpretations,  both statutory and constitutional,
repeatedly in recent years.42  The very tides of the statutes constitute
24  SeeJackson, Federalis7,  supra note 36, at 2228-31,  2257-58.
241  See also Honritz, supra note 139, at 38-40  (suggesting that the 'turn  to histof and explicit
preoccupation  with legitimacy  in the plurality opinion  in Casey were symptoms of  *a crisis of
legitimacy  in  constitutional  thought  in which  the generally  accepted  paradigms...  are  no
longer felt capable of yielding convincing solutions to constitutional questions");  cf. Louis Mi-
chael Seidman,  This Essay Is BrilliantfThis  Essay is Stupid: Positive and Negatne  S&lf.Rrftrmice m  Con-
stitutional  Practie  and Theory, 46 U.C.L.A.  L REv. 501,  504-06  (1998)  (finding pervasive founda-
tional disagreement in modem constitutional  law, discussing how tis phenomena  is reflected
in Supreme Court opinions, and arguing that "loudly insisting on  the truth of one's own  state-
ments can ...  suggest an insecurity as  to their truth"  reflecting  this absence  of fundamental
agreement).
,  Congress did so,  for example, in enacting RFRA to provide greater protection  for relig-
ious practices than provided by Smith v. Employmevt Ditision,  494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990),  and by
enacting a federal flag  burning statute, albeit  with  different  language, after  tlie Court struck
down a state flag burning statute, see  U.S.  v. Eichman, 496  U.S. 310  (1990)  (holding  that tie
Flag Protection Act of 1989, passed  in response to  tie Court's striking of a state flag-burning
statute in  Texas v. Johnson, 491  U.S. 397  (1989),  was also  unconstitutional).  Moreover,  in re-
enacting  the  Gun  Free  School  Zones  Law, albeit  with  an element  of Oaffecting  commerce
added, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)  (1998),  Congress indirectly challenged tie Court's decision hold-
ing unconstitutional a gun ban in U.S. v. Lope , 514  U.S. 549  (1995).  Apart from these constitu-
tional confrontations,  Congress has repeatedly overturned the Court's interpretations of federal
statutes in several areas, including, for example, (1)  federal  civil  rights statutes.  see  e.g., Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555  (1984)  (leading to the Civil Rights Restoration  Act of 1987);
Wards  Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio,  490  U.S. 642  (1989)  (leading to  tie Civil  Rights Act  of
1991); see also Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 251  (1994)  (describing the  1991  law as
a response  to several  Court decisions);  (2)  federal  laws relating  to tle sovereign  immunity of
the United  States, for example,  U.S. Dept. of Energy v.  Ohio, 503 U.S. 607  (1992)  (holding that
even though the United States was a "person" subject to suit under certain  environmental  laws,
it could not be sued for state-imposed punitive damages)  (leading to the Federal  Facility Com-
pliance Act of 1992,  106 Stat. 1505, amending laws to provide specifically  that federal agencies
were not immune from such awards); and (3) the amenability of states to being sued for liabili-JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
a visible confrontation  with the Court - the Religious Freedom Resto-
ration Act, the Civil  Rights Restoration Act - implying  that Congress
is restoring what the Court took away.  This is in contrast to other pe-
riods in  the  Court's  history when  its  most contentious  rulings were
those  imposing limitations on states and were  supported  (or at least
not challenged)  at the national level.  The justices may also perceive
themselves  under greater scrutiny and  attack  by  Congress  at an  ad-
ministrative level  . 2   Finally, members of the Court cannot help but be
aware of the increased  interest in, and familiarity with, other systems
of  constitutional  adjudication  whose  courts  function  well  even
though structured quite  differently  from  those  of the United States.
All of these  factors may contribute  to  the Court's  defensiveness  and
assertiveness  in  excluding  interpretive  sources  not more  within  the
Court's control.  Yet in the constitutional  conversation of which adju-
dication  is  a major  part,  open-mindedness  and  a  willingness  to  be
humble about the correctness  of one's views  may actually go farther
in preserving the rightful legitimacy of the Court.
I  am  guardedly optimistic  that U.S. courts  will be  more open  to
foreign  constitutional  learning in  the future.  In  1996,  for instance,
Justice  Sandra  Day  O'Connor, addressing  the American  College  of
Trial Lawyers, had this to say:
I  think  that I, and  the  other Justices  of the  U.S.  Supreme
Court,  will  find  ourselves  looking  more  frequently  to  the
decisions  of  other  constitutional  courts.  Some,  like  the
ties under federal  statutes such  as the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Federal  Rehabilitation
Act, discussed  in  Vicki  C. Jackson,  One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment  and the
1988 Term, 64 S.  CAL. L. REV.  51,  83  n.141,  89-90  nn.161-162  (1990).  See generally William  N.
Eskridge,Jr., Overriding  Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation  Decisions,  101  YALE L.J. 331  (1991).
243 Federal  elected  officials,  including  the  President,  the  Congress,  and  its members  have
challenged  federal judges  across an array  of the activities  in recent years.  For congressional
challenges to federal  courts' sponsorship of studies of gender and race equality in their courts,
see Todd Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and  Ethnicity in the Federal  Courts, 64 GEO.  WAStI.  L.
REV.  173,  175, 186-88  (1996)  (describing how Senators Gramm, Grassley and Hatch denounced
and tried  to defund federal court-sponsored  studies of gender and race equality).  For an exam-
pie of  unusual congressional  oversight of how federal judges spend their time, see U.S. Senate
Judiciary Comm. on Adm. Oversight and the Courts, Report on Judicial Survey  (May  1996)  (de-
scribing survey of federal judges concerning  how  much time  they spent on  activities such  as
education and case management).  For challenges to a federal judge's  individual adjudicatory
decision  by elected  officials  (outside  the ordinary  course  of U.S. Attorney's  office  litigation),
see, for example, Linda Greenhouse, RehnquistJoins  Fray in Rulings, Defending  Judicial  Independce,
N.Y. TIMEs,  Apr. 10,  1996, at Al  (describing attacks on Judge Harold Baer for exclusion of evi-
dence in drug cases).  In  1996, Congress and the President also passed  the first major spate of
jurisdiction-stripping  legislation to be enacted  in many decades.  See generally Symposium,  Con-
gress and the Courts, 86 GEO. L. J.  2445  (1998)  (discussing the potential impact of federal  laws
restricting the jurisdiction and remedial powers of the federal courts across a range of litigation
brought  by prisoners and  immigrants);  Exordium,  Suspension and Supremacy, Judicial  Power and
Jurisdiction:  The Availability and  Scope of  Habeas Corpus After AEDPA and IIRIRA, 98  COLUINt.  L. RFv.
695 (1998)  (discussing effect of AEDDPA and  IIRIRA on federal courts'jurisdiction in habeas
relief in the post-conviction  and executive detention contexts).
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German and Italian courts, have been working since  the last
world war.  They have struggled with the same  basic consti-
tutional questions that we  have: equal protection, due proc-
ess,  the rule  of law in constitutional  democracies.  Others,
like the South African  court, are relative newcomers  on the
scene but have already entrenched  themselves as guarantors
of civil  rights.  All  these courts have something to teach  us
about the civilizing functions of constitutional  law."
In  1989, ChiefJustice Rehnluist made a similar call for learning from
other constitutional  courts.  Perhaps, then, the United States  is be-
ginning to be ready to open up the constitutional conversation,  if not
across  institutional  borders  between  the  branches  of  government,
then across national borders with other courts.
244  Sandra  Day  O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons:  g7 ' Amticn Judges and Lawyers  Must
Learn  About Foreign  Law, 1997 Spring meeting, American College of Trial La%)vrs,  reprinted in 4
INT'L JUDICIAL OBSERVERJune  1997 at 2  (publication jointly sponsored  by the Federal Judicial
Center and the American Society of International Law).
245  See discussion supra  text accompanying notes 11-12.